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ABSTRACT  
   
   
From its founding, the United States has always claimed to be a nation of 
immigrants, yet in the past century the issue of immigration has become an even 
more contentious political issue surrounded by heated rhetoric filled with passion, 
but devoid of information. This thesis hopes to interrupt this rhetoric with a 
thorough analysis of immigration politics in Arizona through a legal lens, a 
theoretical lens and an empirical lens. While this thesis by no means looks at all 
facets of immigration politics, it informs in a manner that adds depth by providing 
information on the history behind, and legal arguments surrounding, the most 
contentious piece of immigration legislation in the United States at the moment. It 
then provides a theoretical analysis of how immigration legislation has created 
carceral networks and a panoptic gaze in Arizona specifically. It ends with a 
recommendation for further empirical research to partner with both the legal and 
theoretical frameworks.  
This thesis concludes that, fortified with over a century of case law, the 
plenary power doctrine is unwavering, and it makes federal immigration 
legislation an overly powerful tool in our political system from which the courts 
can offer little if any protection. Congress walks a fine line between preempting 
immigration regulation and devolving immigration regulation. SB 1070 and the 
287(g) program are two contested areas of immigration regulation, which both 
exhibit and alter the power relationships of immigration politics in Arizona. 
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Additionally, the application of the theories of Michel Foucault 
illuminates the power relationships at play in Arizona – from the power 
relationships among nation states in the broader political arena of geopolitics and 
colonialism to the face-to-face power relationship between a police officer and a 
stopped/detained/arrested person in a Foucauldian carceral network.  
 This thesis ends with a call for empirical research that would yield an 
opportunity to analyze these relationships. This thesis discusses the importance of 
empirical study. It situates the study within the genre of surveillance studies and 
its theorists. It analyzes similar studies, and identifies the variables the most 
illuminating for this analysis. This thesis is written in the hope that a researcher 
will pick up where this thesis has left off. 
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Chapter 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
From its founding, the United States has always claimed to be a nation of 
immigrants, yet in the past century the issue of immigration has become an even 
more contentious political issue. Unfortunately, it seems the intense passion on 
either side of any immigration issue often leads to heated rhetoric. This rhetoric 
does not inform but rather intensifies entrenched positions. This entrenchment 
leads to greater inflammatory rhetoric even less based upon factual reasoned 
debate, and the cycle continues in a downward spiral. This downward spiral 
seems to find its center and acceleration in Arizona – often called the ground-zero 
of immigration politics.1 This thesis hopes to interrupt this spiral for those who 
will read it, with a thorough analysis of immigration politics in Arizona through a 
legal lens, a theoretical lens and an empirical lens.  
 Through the legal lens, this thesis looks at immigration politics in the 
United States in general and in Arizona more specifically through legislation. It 
will analyze how legislation came to be such a powerful tool in immigration 
politics through tracing the creation and fortification of the plenary power 
doctrine. It will then demonstrate how the United States Congress has further 
control over immigration through preemption of state and local legislation. This 
thesis will then specifically look at how Arizona legislation has figured in this 
federalism tug-of-war, with a deeper look at the infamous SB 1070. Moreover, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dennis Wagner and Emily Bazar, “Arizona has become ‘ground zero’ of immigration fight,” 
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while federal legislation is prohibited in devolving its plenary power onto the 
states in the creation of state immigration legislation, the federal government has 
found a way to devolve power to the states in immigration law enforcement 
through 287(g), which will be discussed further below.  
 With all of this discussion on various powers in immigration politics, a 
theoretical lens can help clarify some of the broader power relationships. Michel 
Foucault’s theoretical work on power can help to trace how Arizona’s 
immigration politics came to be. This thesis will look at geopolitics and 
colonialism, governmentality, power in general, resistance to power, biopower, 
discipline, the prison, the Panopticon and the carceral network as they apply to 
Arizona.  
 Both the legal and theoretical frameworks for analyzing immigration 
politics in Arizona can be combined in future empirical research. Empirically, 
researchers might be able to test the effect of immigration legislation on the 
creation of Foucauldian power relationships, specifically the panoptic-gaze and 
carceral network. This thesis discusses the importance of empirical study, it will 
situate the study within the genre of surveillance studies and its theorists, and 
offer the suggested variables that would be most illuminating in this analysis.  
While this thesis by no means looks at all facets of immigration politics, it 
will hopefully inform in a manner that adds depth by providing information on: 
(1) the history behind, and legal arguments surrounding, the most contentious 
piece of immigration legislation in the United States at the moment, (2) a 
theoretical analysis of how immigration legislation has created carceral networks 
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and a panoptic gaze (3) a possible way to look at both the legal and theoretical 
frameworks empirically. 
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Chapter 2: 
LEGAL: IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
History 
 This section seeks to historicize the present climate in the United States 
generally and Arizona and New Mexico specifically with regard to immigration. 
However, in a paper that so heavily relies on Foucauldian theories, it is important 
to state how and why this history will be different from the Foucault’s methods of 
historicizing: archeology and genealogy. A succinct description of these methods 
is as follows: 
The archeological side involved isolating various order of 
discourse which laid down the conditions for articulating thoughts 
and ideas, propositions and statements through which people made 
sense of their historical time. The genealogical side had more to do 
with non-discursive mechanisms of power which shaped the way 
people saw the world and acted within it. So, the various 
discourses that make up a school curriculum (mathematical, 
scientific, literary) express the archaeological approach. But the 
organisation of the space of the school, the way in which 
classrooms are designed in such a way that the teacher is 
empowered… has more to do with the genealogical side.2 
 
In this manner, “Foucault suggests that we should, rather, try to analyse 
the complexity and indeed the confusing nature of past events.”3 However, there 
is a multiplicity of factors throughout the period spanning from 1492 until the 
present, which have coalesced to this point, and it is not the objective of this 
thesis to summarize them. Moreover, the passing of immigration legislation in 
Arizona can by no means be reduced to the efforts of the lone Russell Pearce, who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Geoff Danaher, Understanding Foucault (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2000), 98. 
3 Sara Mills, Michel Foucault, Routledge Critical Thinkers: Essential Guides for Literary Studies 
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 51. 
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authored the infamous SB 1070. It took the entire legislature to come to a 
majority opinion. Those opinions were quite possibly rendered due to a myriad of 
factors including: some bartering for exchange votes, a constituency that blames 
undocumented workers for the high unemployment rate in the state, the recession, 
which actually caused the high unemployment rate, and (in the case of Russell 
Pearce) the death of his son at the hand of an undocumented immigrant.4 While 
no single locus can claim responsibility, once the immeasurable loci have 
converged in a manner that allows immigration legislation to come to pass – no 
matter what those factors are – immigration legislation as a symptom of those 
forces becomes a symbol of those forces, which can be tracked throughout 
history.  
 Nonetheless, Foucault’s methods were not simply a quirky preference; his 
methods of historicizing were a critique upon tradition history. Therefore, it is 
also important here to alleviate the concerns regarding going about writing history 
in a modern fashion. The modern form of writing history came about in 
conjunction with the exponential expansion of European colonization.5  
This is one of the principal criticisms …Foucault sees it as playing 
an instrumental role in the colonizing process itself and is therefore 
unable to provide a perspective that offers a useful critique of 
colonization. Partly, for Foucault, this is because conventional 
history writing regards history in terms of a single and steady 
progress unfolding over time. This progressive view of history 
…tends to see the world gradually evolving into some ideal state, 
or utopian society. From this perspective, rather than being 
considered as an act of violent aggression by the colonizing force, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ted Robbins, “The Man Behind Arizona’s Toughest Immigrant Laws,” Morning Edition, March 
12, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88125098&ps=rs. 
5 Danaher, Understanding Foucault, 99. 
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colonialism is regarded as an aspect of the evolutionary 
development of history into higher forms of society.6 
 
Regardless of the fact that this section does not historicize in a 
Foucauldian manner of archeology or genealogy, the history presented in this 
paper is not done without this cautionary wisdom from Foucault in mind. This 
history does focus upon the colonizing power’s history of law creation. 
Nevertheless, it is not put forth to be interpreted as a social Darwinian, logical or 
inevitable progression of society “into some ideal state, or utopian society”7 that 
ignores the “violent aggression by the colonizing force”8. It is rather to document 
the use of legislation as a “violent aggression by the colonizing force”9.  
Admittedly, this section does depart with Foucault on more than the 
presentation of history as neither archaeological nor genealogical. Foucault 
asserted that history cannot be synthesized into a coherent whole by identifying 
patterns among events. The following historical account contradicts this view 
explicitly. Immigration legislation has followed a pattern throughout time, 
whether this pattern is case law building upon precedence or the ebb and flow of 
immigration legislation with the economy.10 Moreover, strict adherence to 
Foucauldian methods of writing would criticize the position of the author as a 
historian within the public institution of the university as “the protocols and 
procedures of the institution… will shape how the history will be written.”11 This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 100. 
11 Ibid., 101. 
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is not disputed. This thesis does not offer a complete picture of the social, 
cultural, economic, psychological and anthropological factors that brought about 
today’s situation under scrutiny, nor does it aim to do so. This section is merely 
contextualizing the immigration legislation of today, among its predecessors and 
attempting to show why and how immigration legislation is so powerful and more 
immune to the checks and balances that limit the power of other legislation.  
Lastly, Foucault posits an additional concern regarding the colonialism 
involved in traditional historicizing: “Like colonialism it divides people in to 
subjects and objects, active and passive, the colonizing people who make history 
and develop knowledges, and the colonized people who are made the object of 
such history and knowledge.”12 Again, this section is not aiming to show 
immigration legislation as a way to show what the subjects actively did to 
colonize the passive objects of history. This is merely to document the paper trail 
of immigration legislation and how immigration legislation became so powerful, 
without any implication that this is an exhaustive exposé on how these pieces of 
legislation came about. With this is in mind, let us now embark upon this 
particular history.  
The Plenary Power Doctrine – How Immigration Law became so powerful 
that the Constitution cannot touch it: 
The United States is known as a melting pot, a nation of immigrants, 
which the Statue of Liberty welcomes with the famous words, “Give me your 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 103. 
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tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free”.13 However, 
neither the word immigration, nor any variation of it appears in the constitution. 
Nevertheless, there is today an extensive body of immigration law, and it is 
largely exempt from judicial review via the plenary power doctrine.  
The word plenary comes from the Latin plenus, meaning full. In United 
States legal jargon, it means the full or complete authority by a particular branch 
(or branches) over a particular area of law, with little if any judicial review. 
Therefore, the plenary power doctrine is a doctrine upheld by the Supreme Court 
when holding a case to be non-justiciable on the basis that the legislative or 
executive branch has complete authority over the particular matter. It is important 
to note, that among scholars in the legal field, the plenary power doctrine is most 
often discussed and written about in terms of its applicability to immigration law. 
This is, of course, the manner with which the plenary power doctrine is discussed 
in this thesis, as well.   
 There are some often-referenced justifications for this doctrine that will 
surface in the cases to follow. The political question doctrine is perhaps among 
the most prominent justifications. The political question doctrine holds that the 
court will not rule on cases involving policy questions, which would be better 
dealt with by elected officials, who must reckon with a constituent body.14 To do 
otherwise is sometimes referred to as legislating from the bench. Moreover, the 
political question doctrine acknowledges that the court should defer to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Statue of Liberty - The Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation”, n.d., 
http://www.statueofliberty.org/default_sol.htm. 
14 Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration Policy?, Backgrounders 
and Reports (Center for Immigration Studies, February 2009), http://www.cis.org/plenarypower. 
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judgment of the legislative and executive branch, because the court does not know 
the political ramifications of policy decisions. This goes hand in hand with the 
idea that especially where international relations are concerned (as it is in 
immigration law), the political branches of government should have full 
discretion, as only the political branches truly know the impact of those decisions 
on our relations with other nations.15  
 Also in line with the abovementioned reasons, is uniformity. The 
constitution does demand that there must be a uniform rule of naturalization. This 
has been read to be partially due to not wanting to jeopardize our foreign relations 
by allowing states to make individual and potentially troublesome immigration 
regulations.16  
The reasoning behind relying on the plenary power doctrine will come 
into greater relief as the next section progresses from one case to the next. This 
section seeks to illuminate the history behind Congress’ authority over matters of 
immigration, and trace some of the case law that demonstrates the Federal Courts’ 
unwillingness to interfere in Congress’ plenary power over immigration.  
Although the plenary power has been bolstered and fortified through a 
century of case law, there are substantial broad arguments against this power 
within the legal community, and the Supreme Court itself is creating chinks in the 
plenary power doctrine that might allow for some corrosion in the near future and 
full deterioration in the distant. For now Immigration Law remains not merely a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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symptom of the social, cultural, economic, psychological and anthropological 
factors that brought it into being, but also a powerful tool to be wielded with little 
constraint from the judicial branch.  
The History of Congressional Involvement  
In Article 1 Section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress’ powers 
are defined. Among these powers lies the responsibility “To establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization.”17 The word immigration is actually not included in the 
document. However, this clause has been interpreted to give Congress authority 
over immigration issues. This was not a particularly contentious issue in the first 
one hundred years as a nation, because the United States had extremely porous 
borders in an attempt to populate the countryside and provide sufficient labor. 
This was beneficial during the construction of the railroad, yet upon completion 
Congress passed the first immigration law designed to exclude a particular race: 
the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.18 
 The turn of the century saw many attempts from a xenophobic legislative 
branch to bar immigration further. President Cleveland, President Taft, and 
President Woodrow Wilson vetoed attempts at literacy requirements, but 
Congress eventually overrode the Presidential veto. 19 In 1921 Congress instituted 
a provisional measure establishing national quotas, and in 1924 national quotas, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
18 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin, and Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Citizenship 
Process and Policy, 6th ed. (Thomson West, 2008), 164. 
19 Ibid., 167. 
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as well as exclusions of particular nationalities, were codified in the National 
Origins Act. 20  
 After World War II a shift toward greater tolerance began, but it was 
slowed and tempered by Cold War tensions of the 1950s. Nevertheless, exclusion 
of the Chinese was no longer quite as unconditional. The War Brides Act opened 
immigration to alien spouses, and the United States accepted refugees from 
various war torn countries.  
 As a matter of simplification, in 1952 United States immigration laws 
were consolidated into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The 1965 
amendments to the INA abolished the previous origins formula in favor of 
identical numerical caps for every country in the Eastern Hemisphere, which was 
then twice amended to establish a global cap of 290,000 immigrants per year. 21  
Legislation in the 1980s and through to present day have seen another 
shift, this time toward controlling “illegal entry” or undocumented immigration. 22  
In 1981, President Reagan said, “Our nation is a nation of immigrants. More than 
any other country, our strength comes from our own immigrant heritage and our 
capacity to welcome those from other lands. No free and prosperous nation can by 
itself accommodate all those who seek a better life or flee persecution. We must 
share this responsibility with other countries.”23 With that, President Reagan set 
up a task force, which came to the following recommendations: greater control of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid., 170. 
21 Ibid., 176. 
22 Ibid., 179. 
23 Paul Spickard, Almost All Aliens: Immigration, Race, and Colonialism in American History and 
Identity, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2007), 392. 
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the immigration process, expedited removal, employer sanctions, and an 
immigration policy that reflects the “special relationship with… Canada and 
Mexico”. It also included the acknowledgements that, “We must also recognize 
that both the United States and Mexico have historically benefited from Mexicans 
obtaining employment in the United States,” and “Illegal immigrants in 
considerable numbers have become productive members of our work force. Those 
who have established equities in the United States should be recognized and 
accorded legal status.”24 Author Paul Spickard explains the contradictory timing 
of this welcoming non-hostile viewpoint put forth by President Reagan and the 
shift in immigration legislation,  
Regan’s statement did not reflect hostility to immigrants. It 
eloquently affirmed the primacy of constitutional 
protections…friendship and cooperation with Mexico…the 
contributions of Mexicans and of unauthorized migrants to 
American society… Yet… this did represent the beginnings of a 
dramatic policy change…toward ever-increasing restrictions on 
immigration, especially from Mexico, that would mount… In the 
end, there would be an assault on immigrants in general and 
Mexicans in particular. Many of those constitutional protections… 
and the special friendly relationship with Mexico would be 
obliterated. 25 
 
It began with the 1986 Immigration Reform Control Act (IRCA), which 
attempted to end the employment of undocumented immigrants and enforce 
employer sanctions, while offering amnesty and a path to citizenship to 
undocumented immigrants who entered the country before 1982. However, it 
soon escalated into much more discriminatory legislation with the Personal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Michael C. LeMay and Elliott Robert Barkan, US immigration and naturalization laws and 
issues (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), 276-277. 
25 Spickard, Almost All Aliens, 393. 
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Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act made it so that “illegal immigrants could not apply for or receive 
federally sponsored loans, contracts, business licenses, retirement, welfare, health, 
disability, food assistance or unemployment benefits… and denied some befits 
even to legal immigrants… until they became citizens.”26  
The IIRIRA went much further. It fortified the border by adding 5,000 
(and thereby doubling) Border Patrol agents, and additionally “provided for a new 
corps of agents to investigate and prosecute immigrant smugglers.”27 The IIRIRA 
included the strengthening of previous employer sanctions, building of a fence, 
the creation of a national immigrant identification card, and the collaboration 
between the INS and state governments in “‘investigating, arresting, detaining and 
transporting illegal immigrants’ – to make the local police an arm of la migra.”28 
The IIRIRA “denied legal status to anyone who was in the United States without 
papers… barred people who had been deported from re-entering for up to ten 
years…streamlined procedures by which people could be deported… denying… 
the right to a hearing or access to the court system, and limited judicial review.”29 
The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 then further pushed this 
pendulum swing toward exclusion and border control with the: the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., 394. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 395. 
29 Ibid. 
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the REAL ID Act.30  The USA PATRIOT Act “…gave [the] U.S. Attorney 
General… virtually unlimited authority to investigate, detain, and deport 
whomever they liked…it also allowed the Justice Department to trample on the 
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens and, especially, of immigrants… It attempted 
to deny [non-citizens]… rights to free speech, political association, due process, 
and privacy…”31  
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act directs the 
Attorney General to hire more INS investigators and inspectors (200 over the 
number authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act). Per an amendment to the IIRIRA, 
it also directs the Attorney General to create an electronic verification and 
monitoring system for foreign students. It demands that law enforcement and 
intelligence entities share alien information with INS and Department of State, 
and sets forth an information sharing plan. It mandates that the Secretary of State 
share the electronic visa file of every issued alien visa before the alien enters the 
United States. Lastly, it charges the President with studying the feasibility of a 
North American National Security Program.32  
The REAL ID Act allows immigration judges or the government to 
require an asylum applicant to submit evidence, thereby increasing the applicant’s 
burden of proof substantially. The Act also makes obtaining a driver’s license that 
is also a federal ID (and only two states currently have driver’s license that are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Aleinikoff, Martin, and Motomura, Immigration and Citizenship Process and Policy, 180-181. 
31 Spickard, Almost All Aliens, 457. 
32 F. James Rep Sensenbrenner, “H.R.3525 - Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform 
Act of 2002,” Bill originating in the House, December 19, 2001, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03525:@@@D&summ2=m&. 
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also federal IDs) impossible for undocumented immigrants, because they must be 
able to prove legal status and submit a social security number. Moreover, the 
REAL ID Act directs the Attorney general to fortify the border with “additional 
physical barriers and roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection of 
illegal entrants)”33 and allocates funds to do so. More interestingly, the REAL ID 
Act allows Secretary of Homeland Security to waive any laws that hinder this said 
fortification, and restricts the court review of these waivers to the district courts. 
 This brief history is meant to demonstrate the federal legislative branch’s 
establishment of their role in immigration law and the pendulum of immigration 
legislation from strict exclusion of all Chinese, to greater inclusion in the wake of 
WWII, and the swing back toward greater exclusion and control. These acts have 
not gone uncontested. However, the judicial branch of the federal government has 
developed a body of case law making Congress’ authority over immigration 
matters practically immune from the judicial review established in Marbury v. 
Madison.   
Setting the Scene for the Chinese Exclusion Case 
As abovementioned, the United States originally had extremely porous 
borders. Not only were the borders open, the United States actively recruited 
immigrants. Pamphlets, flyers and posters were sent to Europe glorifying the 
United States, and the United States signed and ratified the Burlingame Treaty 
with China in 1868. The most commonly referred to passage in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 F. James Rep Sensenbrenner, “H.R.418 - REAL ID Act of 2005,” Bill originating in the House, 
January 26, 2005, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR00418:@@@D&summ2=m&. 
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summarizes the spirit of the treaty acknowledging, “… the inherent and 
inalienable right of a man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual 
advantage of free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects… for 
purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents.”34 
Accordingly, Chinese immigrants set sail for the United States. The 
Chinese immigrants sought a better life and higher wages, while the U.S. sought 
railroad labor. The completion of the railroad and an economic downturn in 
California saw a surge of racial hostility – codified in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion 
Act. The Act instituted a ten-year moratorium on Chinese immigration and stated, 
“the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the good order of 
certain localities.”35 Chinese who had already immigrated to the United States 
were exempt in that they were allowed to come and go between China and the 
United States by procuring a certificate before leaving to show immigration 
inspectors upon their return (per an Act passed in 1884).36  
There were of course many gray areas regarding a person’s legality of 
entry. This ambiguity led federal judges to often err on the side of the Chinese 
immigrant.37  So much so, that Congress passed subsequent laws culminating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Burlingame Treaty, July 28, 1868, U.S.-P.R.C., 16 Stat. 739, T.S. No. 48. 
35 F. James Rep Sensenbrenner, “H.R.418 - REAL ID Act of 2005,” Bill originating in the House, 
January 26, 2005, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR00418:@@@D&summ2=m&. 
36 Chinese Exclusion Act, 1882. 
37 Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the 
United States (Oxford University Press, USA, 2006), 15-17, 25-26. 
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with the 1888 Scott Act on which the famous Chinese Exclusion Case is based: 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States.38   
The Beginning of the End of Judicial Review: Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States  
Chae Chan Ping entered the United States in 1875. Twelve years later he 
left to visit China with the intention of returning. Per the restrictions in the acts of 
the 1880s, Chae Chan Ping diligently obtained a certificate from the United States 
government. Procuring this certificate was necessary to prove that Chae Chan 
Ping was exempt from the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, because it showed that he 
had been present in the United States before its passage, and could move freely 
between China and the United States. Unfortunately, between leaving the country 
in 1887 and returning in 1888 the Scott Act was passed, making Chinese 
immigration prohibited even with a certificate.39 Chae Chan Ping alleged the 
1888 law conflicted with the United States’ obligations under the Burlingame 
Treaty and his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.40 
 The Supreme Court ruled against Chae Chan Ping. In the majority 
opinion, Justice Field recognized that the Scott Act contradicted the Burlingame 
Treaty. He simultaneously stated that treaty was not to be considered supreme 
over a legislative act of Congress. The two are of equal weight. Therefore, just as 
when Congress passes new laws when an old law is no longer adequate, Congress 
should have the power to pass an act that goes against the previously accepted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid., 26. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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treaty. More importantly, the courts must recognize the latter law as “…the last 
expression of the sovereign will…” As such, it trumps.41   
 Justice Field then points to the question of whether or not Congress has 
the power to pass an act that excludes non-citizens.  The constitution vests 
authority in Congress to draft and pass laws, which protect our independence and 
security as a nation: “…declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel 
invasion, regulate foreign commerce… and admit subjects of other nations to 
citizenship.”42 
The Supreme Court states that this is a non-negotiable power inherent in 
being a sovereign nation, “If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent 
subject to the control of another power.”43 Additionally, it is necessary, “To 
preserve its independence… against foreign aggression… whether from the 
foreign nation… or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.”44 For 
these reasons and the fact that immigration affects the relationship between 
nations, immigration regulation is found to be a national issue to be left to the 
federal government.  
 Up until the end of Supreme Court Justice Field’s opinion, the jurisdiction 
of the nation in general and legislative and executive branch specifically over 
issues regarding exclusion and immigration has been affirmed, but the role of the 
courts is not discussed. Thus it seems as though the court is only saying that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 N. T Saito, “Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The Plenary Power Justification 
for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, The,” Asian LJ 10 (2003): 15. 
42 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
43 Ibid., 130:605. 
44 Ibid., 130:604. 
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Congress and the President have power over immigration issues, but not yet 
plenary power. This changes with this quote given toward the end of the decision:  
Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous 
law, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected 
by its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it 
applicable only to persons departing from the country after the 
passage of the act, are not questions for judicial determination. If 
there be any just ground of complaint on the part of China, it must 
be made to the political department of our government, which is 
alone competent to act upon the subject, (emphasis added).45  
 
 This quote initiates the precedence of the political branches of government 
having plenary power over immigration issues. The Supreme Court waives its 
right to review immigration law against the constitution against which other laws 
must be pitted to show legitimacy. This case does not go unused, or get 
overturned. Instead, it is used throughout our history and expanded upon with 
each case to create an ever-expanding potential black hole of rights.  
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy: Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism and Anti-
Catholicism, Oh My! 
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote the opinion for the court. In this case, the 
Appellants argue against the constitutionality of the Alien Registration Act of 
1940 (18 U.S.C. § 2385). Appellants argue that because they have been admitted 
for permanent residence, they should have the same constitutional protections as 
citizens. Appellants also argue that the justification for deportation must be 
reasonably related to the protection of the United States.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid., 130:606. 
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 In regards to the first argument, the Supreme Court brings to light that the 
Appellants do not have the same burdens as a citizen, and therefore are not (and 
have never been) afforded legal protection equal to that of citizens. The Court also 
states that, because the Appellants have citizenship elsewhere, they are protected 
by that government and international law. Moreover, according to international 
law a sovereign state retains the right to expel aliens.  
In regards to the second argument, the Supreme Court conceded that the 
Alien Registration Act of 1940 might be a more severe embodiment of the United 
States’ right to expel. However, it also acknowledged that Congress has greater 
information on these matters, and has both expanded and fortified this act since its 
passage. It is important here to quote Mr. Justice Jackson, because the Supreme 
Court refers to this section verbatim in various other cases. 
It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally and 
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to 
the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the 
maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are 
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as 
to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.46  
 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter takes this notion a step further in his concurring 
opinion stating, “But whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, 
whether they may have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-
Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress.” 47  
This is a compelling case, because it resurrects the argument used in the 
Chinese Exclusion Case, defends it, and strengthens it by adding more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid., 130:609. 
47 Harisiades v. Shaugnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (S. Ct. 1952). 
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justification. Writing that it is “largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference” opens the floodgates. It might have been assumed that if there were 
serious constitutional violations the courts might not be able to turn a blind eye, 
but the court even goes so far as to say that even if the immigration laws enacted 
by Congress are full of egregious violations including xenophobia in general or 
anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism which would not be tolerated in other contexts, 
the judicial branch should not step in. This is a foreshadowing of various 
discriminatory policies enacted by Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court in 
the following cases.   
Mathews v. Diaz – Flexibility > Constitutionality  
Appellants Diaz, Clara and Espinosa filed a class action suit in the District 
Court alleging that the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1395o) was 
unconstitutional, based upon discriminatory qualifications for enrollment which 
prohibit aliens from enrolling unless they have both attained permanent residence 
status and have completed five years of residence in the United States. The 
District Court held that it was unconstitutional, because it created subclasses 
among aliens saying, “…the danger of unjustifiable discrimination against 
aliens… is so great, in view of their complete lack of representation in the 
political process, that this… should be tested under the same pledge of equal 
protection as a state statute.”48 
Mr. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of a unanimous Supreme Court, 
which held that neither liberty nor property had been deprived without due 	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process of law. While the Supreme Court did acknowledge that all aliens are 
entitled to the constitutional protection provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments in securing due process, the Court did not believe that this could be 
expanded to imply that all aliens should be classified in the same groups for the 
purposes of granting particular privileges associated with being a member of the 
United States, such as Social Security. The following sentence within this 
reasoning is extensively quoted, “In the exercise of its broad power over 
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens,” 49 (emphasis added). 
While this is objectively true that Congress has unquestionably greater 
authority over aliens in admitting, naturalizing and deporting. This case could 
have been a chance to end Congressional authority there. The Supreme Court 
could have ruled that it is only appropriate for Congress to set rules for admission, 
status, naturalization and deportation because there must be some sort of 
regulation particular to the actual immigration process. However, people should 
otherwise be treated equally under the fifth and fourteenth amendment. Instead, 
the Supreme Court took the fact that Congress is able to treat non-citizens 
differently than they treat citizens in that non-citizens are subject to an 
immigration process, to mean that Congress is able to treat non-citizens 
differently than they treat citizens in greater areas of law and regulation.  
Additionally, the Supreme Court held not just that citizens and non-
citizens can be treated differently, but also that non-citizens can be treated 	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differently from each other by dividing them into various subclasses and 
apportioning various levels of participation in the benefits of the United States to 
said subclasses. The Supreme Court reasons that this “statutory classification does 
not deprive them of liberty or property without due process of law.” 50 Of even 
greater interest in this case is the Supreme Court’s laissez-faire approach, and the 
reasoning behind it. The court decides that because immigration laws and policies 
are often influenced by and influential upon international politics, must be dealt 
with in the political branches only.  
… the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the 
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the 
political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in 
these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and 
since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light 
of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions 
are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the 
Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary. This very case 
illustrates the need for flexibility in policy choices rather than the 
rigidity often characteristic of constitutional 
adjudication…(emphasis added)51 
 
In this way the Supreme Court established a precedence of narrow review, 
if any, of decisions made by the legislative and/or executive branch in the area of 
immigration and naturalization. It exempts immigration law from needing to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny applied to all other laws made by Congress. In 
essence, the Supreme Court gives up the precedence of judicial review established 
in Marbury v. Madison.  
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It is worth noting, that in this case, the distinction amongst aliens is based 
upon the relationship of those aliens to the United States, i.e. duration of stay in 
the United States and status within the United States. Forming subclasses of non-
citizens based upon the relationship to the United States may make logical sense, 
and seem in line with the aforementioned idea of allowing Congress to only 
discriminate amongst non-citizens in regard to the immigration process. 
Unfortunately, this is not the extent of Congressional discretion on creating 
subclasses amongst non-citizens. The next case takes the precedent established in 
this case and expands upon it to not only be discrimination based upon 
relationship and status with the United States, but rather is discrimination amongst 
aliens based upon gender.  
Fiallo v. Bell – Insert the word Immigration and delete protection from 
Gender Discrimination 
 In the case of Fiallo v. Bell the appellants argue against the 
constitutionality of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The Act 
includes a segment designed to aid in the reunification of families by easing the 
immigration process for those who are children or parents of United States lawful 
permanent residents or citizens. There are particular stipulations for the 
determination of whether or not a child or parent qualifies for this. The child may 
be legitimate, legitimated, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child, if 
the child seeks preferential immigration status through a natural mother. For a 
child of a natural father, all of the aforementioned relationships may qualify with 
the exception of one – an illegitimate child.  
  25	  	  	  
 
 While the appellants acknowledge that the immigration context 
necessitates narrow judicial review, the appellants wish for the Supreme Court to 
look at the treatment of the citizen and resident alien that is attempting to be 
reunited with family, not the immigrant seeking to be with family in the United 
States. In this manner the appellants argue that regardless of the immigration 
context, the courts should always protect the rights of citizens.  
To this the Supreme Court by virtue of the opinion Mr. Justice Powell 
delivered reiterates the stance taken in Mathews v. Diaz stating, “… it is 
important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration 
legislation… ‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress 
more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens…largely immune from 
judicial control.”52 Furthermore, the court quotes Mathews v. Diaz writing, 
“Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to 
citizens.” 53 In regard to the Appellants claim that this case is about the rights of 
citizens, the Supreme Court simply deems that Congress has the authority to 
admit or exclude various classes of aliens.  
Moreover, the Appellants claim that this case is unique in that it has at its 
core discrimination both based upon sex and upon illegitimacy. The Supreme 
Court states that this issue has been previously and similarly resolved and that 
there is no reason to revisit. The Court cites its opinion in Kleindienst v. Mandel 
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stating that, if the Executive has a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” 54 the 
courts will not delve into it further as to the Executive’s discretion in matters 
under its jurisdiction. This case thereby, now allows not only subclasses among 
immigrants with regard to their relationship to the United States, but also with 
regard to gender. 
Narenji v. Civiletti – Discrimination based on Nationality is acceptable, if 
being used as an International political pawn. 
 Acting upon direction given by President Carter, on November 13, 1979 
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued regulation 8 C.F.R. § 214.5. This was 
a response to the hostage crisis, which took place at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, 
Iran. The regulation required natives or citizens of Iran who were both 
nonimmigrant aliens and post-secondary school students to report to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide resident information and proof 
of nonimmigrant status maintenance.  
 The Appellants argue against the constitutionality of the regulation stating 
that the Attorney General was not authorized to issue the regulation, nor did the 
International hostage crisis in Iran create an authority to do so. Most importantly, 
the Appellants charged that the creation of a subclass of aliens on the basis of 
nationality blatantly infringes upon the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution.  
The District Court disagreed with the former assertion. It stated that the 
Attorney General is endowed by Congress via the Immigration and Nationality 	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Act to administer and enforce the Act, and thereby may issue regulations to this 
end. The Attorney General must also prescribe the conditions of an alien’s 
residence, and is therefore allowed to check in to make sure that said conditions 
have not been violated. On the contrary, the District Court agreed with the latter 
allegation that this “check in” could not be performed with distinctions based 
upon nationality and thus found the regulation to be unconstitutional.  
 The Court of Appeals did not agree with this second ruling. It ruled that 
the Legislative and Executive branch have full authority to make distinctions as 
they deem necessary in matters of immigration, even if the distinction is based 
upon the immutable characteristic of nationality. The Court stipulated only that 
the distinctions not be “wholly irrational”55 and this regulation was deemed 
rational due to the political context of the time. The Attorney General assured the 
court that this was a matter of foreign policy and national security, as such the 
President has direct authority over such matters and may delegate responsibility to 
the Attorney General as he deems necessary. The Court of Appeals bases this 
standard of rationalism upon the abovementioned Supreme Court cases of 
Mathews v. Diaz and Fiallo v. Bell, and the entirety of the quote provided in the 
above-summarized case of Harisiades v. Shaughnessy is cited.  
INS v. St. Cyr – No Habeas, and No Suspension Clause Necessary.  
 In the case of INS v. St. Cyr the appellant is a citizen of Haiti and a Legal 
Permanent Resident of the United States. He was made deportable by a plea 
bargain in 1996 that included an admission of selling a controlled substance. 	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Upon striking this bargain, St. Cyr knew that there would be an opportunity to 
receive a waiver of deportation from the Attorney General. Shortly thereafter, 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 went into 
effect, as did the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) of 1996. St. Cyr was now no longer eligible to seek a waiver, because 
the Attorney general interpreted the statutes to mean that he no longer had that 
authority.56  
St. Cyr contested the Attorney General’s interpretation by way of a writ of 
habeas corpus. Herein lies the problem: the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) argues that AEDPA and IIRIRA denied courts the jurisdiction by 
which to decide a case brought via habeas corpus. This is the issue with which the 
Supreme Court wrestles. It does not come to a unanimous decision. Supreme 
Court Justice Stevens delivered the opinion.  
 Stevens asserts that the INS must prove that it is not overwhelmingly 
assumed that the federal courts would naturally have judicial review and that 
Congress had a clear and explicit intent to bar courts from habeas jurisdiction in 
passing AEDPA and IIRIRA. The court does set the bar reasonably high stating, 
“Implications from statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal 
habeas jurisdiction…”57 Additionally, there must be no plausible alternative 
interpretation. Stevens even goes so far as to say that there must be some form of 
review (“…a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if… the 1996 
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statutes have withdrawn that power… and provided no adequate substitute for its 
exercise.”)58 and that aliens should not be presumed to have less access to habeas 
corpus given the longstanding history of aliens’ full access to it.   
 Therefore, the court held “…the absence of such a forum, coupled with the 
lack of a clear … congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on 
habeas… strongly counsels against adopting a construction that would raise 
serious constitutional questions. Accordingly, we conclude that habeas 
jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA.”59   
 Although this may appear at first glance to be a holding suggesting that 
the Supreme Court is retaining their grasp upon habeas corpus and taking back a 
bit of the plenary power granted Congress, it is actually quite the opposite. The 
court is actually implying in this decision that it is absolutely within the power of 
Congress to strip the courts of judicial review of Habeas Corpus, and that this 
would not cause a constitutional question of violating the Suspension Clause, 
which allows for the suspension of Habeas Corpus in specific situations only. 
This could be accomplished by providing review in another forum.  
Furthermore, even the dissenting opinion provided by Supreme Court 
Justice Scalia with whom the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice 
O’Connor join does not disagree with the conclusion that Congress can take away 
Judicial Review of Habeas Corpus. In fact, it takes this concept a step further to 
say that in this instance these particular judges believe that the statutes in question 
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were explicit enough to conclude that Congress did strip the courts of judicial 
review.  
This case further bolsters Congress’ power to dictate to the courts what 
they can and cannot review, which is the issue at the heart of Congress’ plenary 
power over Immigration Law. As has been shown in the previous cases assisting 
in the creation of this doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that immigration is 
“largely immune from judicial control,” yet this is expanding the potential void of 
judicial control to encompass something as fundamental as Habeas Corpus. 
This potential void came to fruition shortly thereafter. Congress passed the 
REAL ID Act, which was explicit about denying courts judicial review of 
removal orders, and mentioning 28 U.S.C. § 2241 explicitly. As for the second 
part of the Supreme Court’s standard that Habeas Corpus must have another 
venue in which it can be reviewed, Congress empowered the Appellate Courts to 
do so. In this manner, the Supreme Court offered more power to Congress, and 
Congress gladly took it.  
Constitutional Concerns: Unconstitutional, but with the Supreme Court 
Stamp of Approval.  
 Perhaps the strongest and most frequent argument made against the 
plenary power doctrine is something that the Supreme Court itself would quite 
possibly agree with: it goes against the United States constitution. This statement 
might appear brazen at first, as is the accusation that the Supreme Court would 
concede. There is evidence.  
  31	  	  	  
 
 The Supreme Court acknowledges that expelling and excluding foreigners 
cannot be found among the enumerated powers. Instead the Supreme Court and 
other proponents assert that it is an inherent power derived from simply being a 
sovereign nation with a line of demarcation between this nation and the next, over 
which nouns of all types may only cross legally with the express permission of the 
nation state.  
 It could be argued that the Supreme Court does not see the plenary power 
as being against the constitution, but rather as exempt from the rules with which 
the constitution constricts all other laws made in the United States.60 The above 
quoted excerpt from Mathews v. Diaz demonstrates this line of thought perfectly: 
“This… illustrates the need for flexibility in policy choices rather than the rigidity 
often characteristic of constitutional adjudication.”61 This bold statement by the 
court does little to assuage the argument that there should be constitutional 
adjudication on all laws, not simply a majority.  
 Additionally, there is no leap to be made in regards to whether or not 
aliens are supposed to be granted constitutional protection. As far back as the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, aliens were afforded protection in the courts. As far back 
as 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins aliens were deemed to be protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the reading of “person”.62 The Fifth Amendment is 
also repeatedly cited as being violated by the plenary power doctrine through the 
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reading of the words “No Person” at its start.63  It is only in the arena of 
immigration law, wherein the rights afforded some persons evaporate.64   
 Supreme Court Justice Douglas summarized the constitutional argument 
against the plenary power doctrine in his dissenting opinion of Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy writing, “The immigration power… flows from sovereignty… The 
power of deportation is therefore an implied one. The right to life and liberty is an 
express one. Why this implied power should be given priority over the express 
guaranty of the Fifth Amendment has never been satisfactorily answered.”65   
 Conversely, there is an argument not necessarily against the use of the 
plenary power doctrine, but rather against the existence of the plenary power 
doctrine and any conflict with the constitution. While it must be taken into 
consideration, it by no means makes the invocation of the plenary power doctrine 
by the Supreme Court any less troubling.  
This line of thought challenging the existence of a plenary power doctrine 
is best explained by Gabriel J. Chin in his article, “Is there a Plenary Power 
Doctrine?” In this article he does acknowledge, “The Court’s record in this 
context consists of a string of cases, over a century long, upholding with 
depressing regularity statutes discriminating on the basis of race, sexual 
orientation, political activity, and sex and birth out-of-wedlock.”66 However, he 
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adds to this that at the time these court cases were decided, similar discrimination 
was upheld domestically against citizens. Thus, these decision did not conflict 
with the constitutional protections read into constitutional law at the time.  
Chin points to the fact that “…the year Chae Chan Ping was decided, state 
and federal courts upheld racial segregation in schools, miscegenation laws, 
exclusion of witnesses on the basis of race, and laws granting benefits to whites 
but not to blacks.”67 During the time of Harisiades, Communism was deemed to 
be advocating overthrowing the government, and therefore the restriction of some 
of its members’ free speech rights was deemed constitutional. Therefore 
Harisiades’ communist sympathies probably would have still assured a similar 
outcome in the case.68  
Chin also illuminates for the Fiallo case that unwed fathers who happened 
to be citizens were also discriminated against.69 However, Chin acknowledges 
that the precedent of Fiallo is still troubling because, “Exclusion, deportation and 
naturalization restrictions based on religion, sexual orientation and race are gone, 
and those based on Communist Party membership much diluted. Oddly, however, 
discrimination based on sex and birth out-of-wedlock remains a substantial part of 
the INA,”70 and “the domestic and immigration paternity cases do seem 
inconsistent with the sex discrimination cases of recent years.”71 
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With regard to Mathews v. Diaz, the author reasons that the case would 
not have been decided otherwise, if held to constitutional scrutiny, because “Few 
public benefit programs are available to all without regard to some eligibility 
criteria like age, assets, income, family relationship, or health, so the domestic 
cases in this line typically uphold limiting benefits to some class or classes.”72  
With this background knowledge of the time period in which these cases 
were decided, Chin states, “Typically, the Court has upheld discriminatory 
immigration laws during periods when domestic discrimination against citizens 
was permitted on the same basis. Therefore, typically the discrimination was 
consistent with domestic constitutional law. By the time the Court’s jurisprudence 
became suspicious of the classification at home, Congress had often changed the 
discriminatory practice, preempting a judicial test under an interpretation of the 
Constitution which might be more favorable to the immigrant.”73 Thus, while 
these distinctions might have been deemed constitutional at the time had they 
been subjected to constitutional scrutiny, the harrowing fact of the matter is that 
these decisions have not yet been overturned and can be relied upon as precedent.  
This brings us to Chin’s overarching question. Chin does not argue that 
the plenary power doctrine was mistakenly applied by scholars to the area of 
Immigration Law, but rather poses the question of: Why has the Supreme Court 
said that they are following a plenary power doctrine in these cases, when it 
seems that these cases would have been decided no differently in their day, if the 
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appellants had been citizens? “If most of the immigration cases could have been 
decided the same way without any special constitutional rule, the Supreme 
Court’s continuing insistence that there is a plenary power doctrine becomes 
mysterious.”74  
Chin offers two explanations.  
One possible explanation is that although the Court often says that 
Congress has plenary power over immigration, it often says that 
Congress has plenary power over everything that it does…It may 
be that the plenary power doctrine is merely a restatement of the 
familiar principle that federal courts cannot invalidate acts of 
Congress simply because they believe them to be unwise, but only 
if the acts are unconstitutional.75  
 
Another possible explanation is that the Court may want to leave 
itself room in the event that it does face a statute or executive 
decision genuinely based on foreign policy or national security 
grounds. It may unnecessarily emphasize the limited nature of its 
review to make it clear that it has leeway in the difficult cases.76 
 
However, even if this scholar is right, this thesis maintains that the 
Supreme Court’s continued reliance on the plenary power doctrine as the 
reasoning behind these discriminatory decisions is still worrisome. It opens the 
door for greater discrimination among aliens than among citizens. It is much the 
same the executive of any government declaring a state of emergency. It is 
terrifying because of the power that can be freely wielded.  
Put another way, Chin states, “If the plenary power doctrine is largely 
dicta, it is harmful dicta. There is value in accurately expressing the controlling 
principles of law…If our immigration law is not a kind of “laboratory of 	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autocracy” but is instead simply a part of our constitutional law, the Court should 
so say.”77 
The International Scene: Human Rights Take Center Stage While State 
Sovereignty Plays a Supporting Role.  
After World War II, the international community came to the consensus 
that perhaps the sovereign balance of power that had ruled international relations 
since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, was insufficient. A shift was made toward 
balancing state sovereignty with individual human rights with the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, which was then codified into two treaties: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  
Since then various legal fora have come into being that may hold the 
United States accountable on some level for human rights abuses, or the lack of 
rights afforded non-citizens in the United States. Some include: the ICCPR 
Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission, the Inter-American 
Court, the International Court of Justice, the United Nations General Assembly, 
United Nations Human Rights Council, the Secretary general and High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and Universal Jurisdiction.  
Each of these fora have a variety of pros and cons, as well as level of 
efficacy in actually being able to affect change in the nation state in question. 
However, the mere existence of this variety of fora, and the fact that the United 
States along with a resounding majority of the rest of the world (or region in the 	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instance of the Inter-American Commission/Court) can be judged in these fora, is 
a testament the world’s intolerance of sovereignty trumping individual human 
rights without question.  
The Supreme Court has claimed that Congress’ plenary power is derived 
not from the constitution, but rather from the concept of sovereignty. Yet today’s 
concept of sovereignty (especially when individual human rights are in question) 
resembles very little of the concept of sovereignty in 1889 when the Supreme 
Court decided the Chinese Exclusion Case, and the international scene is wrought 
with examples of various countries’ sovereignty being infringed upon, because of 
alleged human rights violations.78 In this way, without even acknowledging 
specific violations of specific treaties (of which countless have been alleged in the 
United States) it is argued that Congress’ plenary power over immigration law, is 
at the very least, outdated, and perhaps even in conflict with modern international 
law.  
R.I.P. Plenary Power 1888 – 2001? 
 Given these constitutional and international considerations, as well as the 
plethora of opponents of the plenary power doctrine among legal 
theorists/professionals, it is no surprise that some have been calling for its demise 
for quite a long time now. While demise might not be in sight, the plenary power 
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doctrine might be faltering. Peter J. Spiro writes about this in his article entitled, 
“Explaining the End of Plenary Power.”79  
 Spiro notes that the decline in the deference to plenary power is not simply 
to be viewed as part of an overall trend in increasing constitutional or judicial 
supremacy, as neither is on the rise.80  Instead, Spiro hypothesizes that this shift is 
a reaction to the international context. This is of great interest, because it was 
international concerns in political decision-making from which the plenary power 
first burgeoned; it would be quite interesting, if it were to also lead to the plenary 
power’s ultimate downfall. Spiro lists more international dynamics to be taken 
into consideration than mentioned above.  
 Spiro cites the fact that international politics are not nearly as volatile as 
they were in the late 1800s or even in the late 1900s during the Cold War. With 
this volatility, there were good reasons to be nervous about any involvement of 
the judicial branch in foreign policy matters.81 Now, not only is there greater 
stability on the world stage, there is also an acceptance of domestic courts on the 
international stage. Domestic courts have appeared on the international stage 
through extradition, universal jurisdiction, truth commissions, and in the United 
States – the Alien Tort Statute.82 Spiro does acknowledge that September 11, 
2001 might affect this trend. However, it is not clear how.  
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 While these factors may explain a shift away from reliance on the plenary 
power doctrine, Spiro argues that this shift is already taking place, and is 
exemplified in the Supreme Court cases: Nguyen v. INS and Zadvydas v. Davis.83 
Nguyen is a case regarding requirements for citizenship of children born out of 
wedlock to fathers as opposed to mothers outside of the United States. The 
Supreme Court could have simply upheld the decision made in Fiallo v. Bell 
explained above, wherein the plenary power doctrine was invoked quoting 
Mathews v. Diaz writing, “Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 84 Instead, the Supreme Court chose to utilize 
“…the standard equal protection analysis for gender-based classifications, without 
any alteration… to account for the immigration context.”85 In this way, Nguyen 
opens up the plenary power doctrine to vulnerability, while Zadvydas v. Davis 
makes a direct strike.  
Zadvydas v. Davis deals specifically with detention. Upon having received 
a final order of removal, an alien may be held in custody (per the INA) for up to 
90 days, during which time the Government is to secure said removal. If the alien 
has not been removed by the end of those 90 days, the INA stipulates that they 
may be detained longer or released with particular supervision if the alien is: 
“…inadmissible…removable [as a result of violations of status requirements or 
entry conditions, violations of criminal law…security… foreign policy… 
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determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to 
comply with… removal…”86  
The length of detention post-90-days could be read to be based solely 
upon the discretion of the Attorney General. The Supreme Court challenges that 
this reading of the statute places the constitutionality of the Act in jeopardy.87  
Therefore, the Supreme Court holds that the Act must be read to avoid such a 
constitutional conflict. So, they read in that the post-removal-period must only be 
for the amount of time that is “reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s 
removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.”88  
Justice Breyer also delves into how another reading of the Act to permit 
indefinite detention would be clearly at odds with the Fifth Amendment, seeing as 
the alien’s liberty has been taken away without the due process of a criminal 
proceeding, because it would have been a civil proceeding.89 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court asserts that the constitution certainly does apply in this instance, 
because the aliens have been admitted into the United States; this is not an 
exclusion case.90   
The Government brings up the plenary power doctrine specifically, and 
states that the judicial branch “must defer to executive and legislative branch 
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decisionmaking [sic]”.91 To this Justice Breyer responds, “But that power is 
subject to important constitutional limitations,”92 (emphasis added). 
 In this way, the Supreme Court has not only refused to simply grant 
Congress plenary power over matters of Immigration Law. It goes further to place 
a piece of Immigration Law under constitutional scrutiny in several ways: 1) 
reading in a reasonable standard, so as to avoid a constitutional problem with 
detention, 2) applying the Act to the Fifth Amendment and showing how it would 
be in conflict with it due to the civil proceeding, 3) discussing the border issue of 
when the constitution goes into effect protecting aliens – and deeming it to have 
gone into effect for aliens admitted into the country. Then the Supreme Court 
again takes this even another step further when prodded by the Government to 
address the plenary power doctrine head-on. The Supreme Court explicitly says, 
“that power is subject to important constitutional limitations,”93 which certainly 
knocks down the plenary power doctrine a few pegs from where it stood twenty-
five years prior in Mathews v. Diaz, wherein the Supreme Court touted, 
“flexibility in policy choices rather than the rigidity often characteristic of 
constitutional adjudication.”94 
Of course, knocking it down a peg is not the equivalent of assured 
destruction. In fact, the Supreme Court leaves room to give unconditional 
deference to Congress in this decision saying, “Despite this constitutional 
problem, if ‘Congress has made its intent… clear, ‘we must give effect to that 	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intent’’”95 Moreover, Spiro points out that although the Supreme Court did 
acknowledge that the executive branch’s primacy in foreign policy matters, 
“require courts to listen with care when the Government’s foreign policy 
judgments… are at issue, and to grant the Government appropriate leeway…”96, 
that requirement is a “far cry from the stance… of nonjusticiability [sic].”97 
Summary: The Rise, the Teetering, the Fall?  
From the beginning of the United States as a Federation the constitutional 
clause including the word “naturalization” has been interpreted to confer 
enumerated power over immigration law to Congress. This went unquestioned as 
the United States allowed immigrants to stream through porous borders. It was 
not until there was an attempt to stem this tide with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882 that the Supreme Court added that this power over immigration law was 
inherent in being a sovereign nation, and as such necessitated the ability to act 
politically with other countries and without interference from the judicial branch.   
 Case law then fortified and bolstered this position. In Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy did so by introducing a chilling and oft quoted phrase justifying 
plenary power over immigration law by saying, “Such matters are so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches… largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference.”98 Mathews v. Diaz contributes the Supreme Court’s determination 
that political decisions “need… flexibility… rather than the rigidity … of 
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constitutional adjudication,”99 taking another step back from any involvement in 
Immigration Law. While Mathews v. Diaz did create subclasses among aliens, 
these subclasses were based upon the relationship between the alien and the 
United States (length of residence and permanent residency status), Fiallo v. Bell 
continued to allow for the creation of subclasses among aliens – this time 
allowing for discrimination based on gender. This quote drawn from Mathews and 
inserted into the justifying rationale of Fiallo echoes throughout later court cases 
on plenary power, “Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if 
applied to citizens.”100 Narenji v. Civiletti makes gender interchangeable with 
nationality to create subclasses of aliens. Lastly, INS v. St. Cyr implicitly grants 
Congress the power to strip aliens of Habeas Corpus without abiding by the 
prerequisites in the Suspension Clause.  
 Just when it seems as though the plenary power can grab no greater hold 
over Immigration Law, that power begins to slip from grasp. Some argue that 
there is simply no longer a way to justify the constitutionality of immigration law 
exceptionalism. Some argue that this plenary power no longer protects us from 
international conflict, but rather might actually create international conflict, or at 
least be in conflict with modern day international politics. Lastly, Peter J. Spiro 
offers two additional cases to look at from the very same year as INS v. St. Cyr, 
which might signal the decline of the plenary power doctrine. At the very least, 
the Supreme Court shows that it is willing to apply the constitutional rigidity to 
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matters falling under Immigration Law, and a reluctance to lean on the easy 
justification of the plenary power doctrine. It does seem that, “It may be a bit 
premature to enter a tombstone date on plenary power, but the grave has been 
dug.”101 
A Continuance of Congress’ Power: Federal Preemption 
Not only does the United States legislative branch enjoy plenary power 
over another federal branch with regard to immigration regulation, it also has 
authority over state legislative branches. This is in part due to the creation of the 
plenary power doctrine. The combination of the Supreme Court’s affirmation 
throughout our nation’s history of Congress’ exclusive authority over immigration 
regulation, and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution creates 
preemption.  
Preemption is the displacement of state law by federal law. In De Canas v. 
Bica, the Supreme Court laid out a three-part test against which State law must be 
weighed in deciding whether or not it is preempted by federal law. If the law fails 
any of the three tests it is preempted. This three part test deems that a state or 
local law is preempted: if the piece of legislation is attempting to regulate 
immigration, if Congress intended to occupy the field in a manner that excludes 
state or local involvement, or if the state/local law conflicts with federal law. 
Regulation of Immigration: 
Regulation of immigration is prohibited for much the same reason that the 
judiciary branch was hesitant to become involved in review of immigration 	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legislation in the 1800s. It is a sensitive and possibility volatile foreign policy 
issue. At best, it would be chaotic to have fifty different immigration regulation 
policies affecting our foreign policy and relationships with foreign nations.  
Regulation of immigration is “a determination of who should or should 
not be admitted into the country and the conditions under which a legal entrant 
may remain.”102 At first glance, this definition might seem to simply mean that 
state and local governments cannot bar admission, set quotas or change the terms 
of visas (conditions under which a legal entrant may remain). However, the courts 
have interpreted this definition to be quite far-reaching.  
Merely classifying immigrants upon arrival to the United States was 
deemed unconstitutional because it “concern[s] the admission of citizens and 
subjects of foreign nations.”103 The infamous California Proposition 187 was 
found unconstitutional, because it regulated immigration by, “creating a 
comprehensive scheme to detect and report the presence and effect the removal” 
of undocumented immigrants.104 Moreover, immigration legislation aimed at 
denying undocumented immigrants the ability to rent or lease from landlords has 
been deemed preempted, because it regulates immigration by affecting the 
“conditions under which a legal entrant may remain”105 by denying some the 
ability to lease or rent shelter.  
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Field Occupation: 
With regard to field preemption, really any law that attempts to legislate 
on any facet of immigration touched upon in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) is preempted, and the INA is a fairly thorough document. However, 
typically where the INA has been found lacking and a state or local legislature has 
been able to pass a non-preempted piece of legislation, Congress has subsequently 
passed legislation to cement its occupation of that previously empty field of 
immigration legislation. (Much like the abovementioned case of INS v. St. Cyr, 
when the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had not intended to strip the courts 
of judicial review of Habeas Corpus and Congress subsequently passed the REAL 
ID Act, in order to explicitly show their intention to bar the courts of judicial 
review of Habeas Corpus.) This occurred with employer sanctions, as these pieces 
of state and local legislation were not preempted, until Congress passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act.106  
Additionally, “Where an ordinance creates a separate scheme of reporting 
and investigating violations of immigration law or would create a separate system 
for determining immigration status, the ordinance would be preempted because 
the state or locality would be operating in a field occupied by Congress.”107 This 
is important to note, because this is where many pieces of legislation run afoul of 
Congressional authority – by claiming to “enforce” “existing” federal legislation 
albeit with new “schemes”.  
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Conflict Preemption 
“A state or local statute is conflict-preempted if it (1) burdens or conflicts 
“in any manner with any federal laws or treaties” or (2) stands ‘as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress,’”108 or “conflicts with federal law making compliance with both state 
and federal law impossible.”109  
Circling back to the last quote of the field preemption section, creating a 
separate enforcement scheme for investigation, auditing, reporting, or determining 
immigration status would also invalidate a law under conflict preemption as it 
would conflict and interfere with the enforcement mechanisms put in place by the 
United States Congress.110 A prime example is California’s Prop 187. In LULAC 
v. Wilson, the Supreme Court held that the “classification, notification and 
cooperation/reporting provisions delegate to state agents tasks which federal law 
delegates exclusively to federal agents.”  
Devolution 
Although federal preemption and the plenary power doctrine seem to 
allow Congress to wield power over immigration law however it deems 
necessary, Congress is limited in its ability to devolve power onto the states to  
pass immigration law. As evidenced by the preemption doctrine, states must 
complete the De Canas obstacle course to pass legislation that is not preempted 
by Congressional authority. However, there is another hurdle to passing 	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immigration legislation at the state level: Graham v. Richardson and Aliessa v. 
Novello.  
Graham v. Richardson 
As was previously mentioned, Yick Wo set the precedence for non-citizens 
to be included in the reading of the word “persons” in the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, there was a loophole through which 
state legislation could discriminate to protect a “special public interest”, whether 
that be common property or resources. This special interest doctrine was upheld 
unchanged in numerous cases until Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n. In this 
particular case, a California statute was deemed unconstitutional for two reasons. 
First, it could not fall under the special public interest doctrine, because California 
cannot claim ownership or trusteeship of all fish in its coastal waters. Second, and 
more importantly, the statute did not simply bar noncitizens generally; it barred 
those ineligible to citizenship, thus targeting Japanese aliens specifically. 
Targeting a specific race/nationality was deemed to be an “invidious 
discrimination”. Takahashi put important limits (“the power of a state to apply its 
law exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow 
limits”111) upon the special public interest doctrine that would come to bear upon 
the decision of Graham v. Richardson. 
In Graham v. Richardson statutes in Arizona and in Pennsylvania 
attempted to bar persons living in those states of welfare benefits based upon 
citizenship requirements and (for Arizona) length of residence (fifteen years). 	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Arizona and Pennsylvania attempted to invoke the special public interest doctrine 
due to the limited resources for welfare benefits. However, the court looked to 
Takahashi and found that California’s statute did not protect such a special public 
interest as would justify the discrimination against non-citizens. Importantly, this 
introduced the idea that the special interest had to outweigh the detriment to non-
citizens.  
Furthermore, the court in Graham overturned the New York court’s 
opinion in People v. Crane (upheld in the Supreme Court Case of Crane v. New 
York) which read, “Whatever is a privilege, rather than a right, may be made 
dependent upon citizenship,”112 and instead stating, “… this Court now has 
rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental 
benefit is characterized as a ‘right’ or as a ‘privilege.’”113 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court found that “There can be no ‘special public interest’ in tax 
revenues to which aliens have contributed on an equal basis with the residents of 
the State.”114 Lastly, the court (without citing De Canas as it was decided five 
years later) found that the Arizona and Pennsylvania laws were preempted.  
In this manner, while historically the federal government has been 
permitted through the plenary power to discriminate against non-citizens; this 
case says that states may not discriminate against non-citizens by significantly 
closing the special public interest doctrine loophole and by claiming that 
immigration laws can be preempted by federal law (which will, of course, be 	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expanded upon in De Canas v. Bica). However, the question remains: “What if 
the federal government authorizes the states to discriminate based upon 
citizenship status through federal legislation?”, or put another way, “Can the 
federal government devolve some of their legislative plenary power immune from 
judicial review onto the states?” This brings us to Aliessa v. Novello. 
Aliessa v. Novello 
 The main question facing the New York State Supreme Court was: 
“whether a state’s discriminatory policies against lawful immigrants are 
countenanced under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
when they are specifically authorized by the Congress.”115 While the New York 
Supreme Court ruled that “regrettably” they are, the New York Court of Appeals 
ruled, “states may not discriminate against lawful immigrants on the basis of 
alienage without violating the equal protection guarantees of the federal 
Constitution, notwithstanding congressional authorization to do so.”116 
 As with Graham v. Richardson, this case centered upon welfare benefits. It 
all began with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA), which “restricts immigrant’s eligibility for certain federally 
funded public assistance benefits, such as Supplemental Security Income, Food 
Stamps, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, and Medicaid.”117 Title IV 
specifically of PRWORA discontinued coverage for many immigrants who had 
previously qualified for Medicaid, some entirely and some only until they have 	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resided in the United States for five years. Title IV also explicitly allows states to 
extend that ineligibility period beyond five years. Moreover, Title IV allows states 
to deny state-funded Medicaid to qualified aliens who are not eligible for 
federally funded Medicaid.118 
 New York took the bait and passed the Welfare Reform Act of 1997. 
Under this law, immigrants who had suddenly found themselves ineligible for 
federally funded Medicaid coverage were now barred from state-funded Medicaid 
coverage as well – per Title IV of PRWORA.  
 The class action suit contesting the Welfare Reform Act of 1997 sought to 
show that the state legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution. In 2001, the New York Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiffs. 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that although Congress has extreme latitude (as 
evidenced in the aforementioned cases developing and fortifying the plenary 
power doctrine) to discriminate against lawful immigrants in manners that would 
be unacceptable if applied to citizens, and does not violate the equal protection 
principles, so long as there is a “rational basis” for doing so, the Constitution 
“does not afford similar judicial deference to state-created policies and practices 
that discriminate against lawful immigrants.”119 In fact, the court applies strict 
scrutiny to state legislation thought to be in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Moreover, as in Graham, the Court did not allow for the special 
public interest doctrine and acknowledged that lawful resident aliens “contribute 
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to our economy, serve in the Armed Forces and pay taxes, including, of course, 
taxes that fund State Medicaid.”120  
 However, the counsel for New York argued that even though State 
legislation is typically not exempt from the strict scrutiny applied, it should be 
exempt in this case because the Congress used its position of immunity from 
judicial review of immigration law to explicitly authorize the State’s 
discriminatory legislation.  
 In the Court’s reasoning against the counsel for New York, Congress’ 
power to devolve power onto the states was severely limited. The court did so 
with a reading of the Naturalization Clause, which reads that Congress shall 
“establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization.” The word uniform figures 
prominently in this clause. Congress derives much of its plenary power and power 
of preemption from the idea that due to foreign policy considerations and 
federalism in general, there must be uniformity in immigration law immune from 
the tinkering of all fifty states and the swaying of the court, which could upset the 
volatile balance of foreign relations. In so doing, the Court did much more than 
simply strike down New York’s law. The Court limited Congress’ ability to allow 
States to create Immigration Legislation, by stating that the requirement for 
uniformity made Title IV impermissible. 
 As we approach the next question with regard to the web of power 
wielded in immigration law, it is important to keep the following in mind. While 
the plenary power doctrine is typically thought of in terms of judicial deference to 	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the legislative branch, it includes deference to the executive branch, as well. A 
quick look back at the case that began it all, Chae Chan Ping, confirms: 
Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous 
law, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected 
by its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it 
applicable only to persons departing from the country after the 
passage of the act, are not questions for judicial determination. If 
there be any just ground of complaint on the part of China, it must 
be made to the political department of our government, which is 
alone competent to act upon the subject, (emphasis added).121 
 
This begs the question: If the legislative branch of the federal government cannot 
devolve power onto states to pass immigration law, can the federal legislative 
branch devolve power onto states to enforce immigration law?  
Devolution of Immigration Law Enforcement 
 As concluded above, the United States Congress’ hold on the plenary 
power with regard to judicial review of immigration legislation, while not quite as 
steadfast as it was prior to the few recent cases of the late 1990’s, remains 
unequivocal. Moreover, the standard outlined in De Canas v. Bica has been 
shown to set the bar extremely high for state legislation to escape the shadow of 
federal legislation. Moreover, even if Congress legislates to allow States to create 
discriminatory legislation, it is impermissible. The plenary power is a double-
edged sword, as it both empowers and restrains Congressional immigration 
legislation. Yet despite this sometimes-welcome sometimes-unwelcome iron grip 
of Congress over immigration law, power is slowly slipping into the hands of 
state and local law enforcement.  
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 By setting a standard for which immigration legislation can be preempted 
De Canas implies that not all pieces of state legislation regarding immigration 
will be preempted. Interestingly, Gonzales v. City of Peoria the Ninth Circuit 
court ruled that a particular law out of Arizona was not preempted: 
We assume that the civil provisions of the Act regulating 
authorized entry, length of stay, residence status, and deportation, 
constitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme, as would be 
consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration. 
However, this case does not concern that broad scheme, but only a 
narrow and distinct element of it – the regulation of criminal 
immigration activity by aliens. The statutes relating to that element 
are few in number and relatively simple in their terms. They are 
not, and could not be, supported by a complex administrative 
structure. It therefore cannot be inferred that the federal 
government has occupied the field of criminal immigration 
enforcement.122 
 
This difference between a criminal violation and civil violation is important to 
immigration law enforcement. The Department of Justice (DOJ) published an 
opinion seconding the views of the Ninth Circuit supporting the ability of the state 
to enforce criminal violations of the INA, yet it added that “state and local police 
lack recognized legal authority to stop and detain an alien solely on suspicion of 
civil deportability as opposed to a criminal violation of the immigration laws or 
other laws.”123 The difference is as follows: under section 275 of the INA 
illegally entering the country is a criminal offence, whereas merely being illegally 
present in the country is a civil violation (such as overstaying a visa).  
This opinion of the court and the DOJ was subsequently codified into law, 
thereby officially devolving the supreme power of Congress to state and local 	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officials. As part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 
1252c reads: “State and local law enforcement officials are authorized to arrest 
and detain an individual who – (1) is an alien illegally present in the United 
States; AND (2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States 
and deported or left the United States after such conviction.”124 (emphasis added) 
Legislation on bequeathing additional enforcement power to state and 
local officials did not stop there. A number of amendments to the INA during the 
1990s passed in an attempt to increase cooperation between state and local police 
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Moreover, some 
amendments even “prohibited ordinances restricting communications between 
local agencies and the INS.”125 
For years this devolution of power was a one-way street, as state and local 
law enforcement agencies were not taking the bait. Most simply did not want 
further involvement in immigration law enforcement, because they believed their 
resources and manpower were already stretched too thin. Other departments had 
the foresight to acknowledge the detrimental effects it could potentially have upon 
relations between law enforcement and immigrant communities. It was not until 
September 11, 2001 that police forces began to contemplate their role in 
immigration law enforcement as being part of a broader antiterrorism effort.  
After September 11, 2001, the DOJ under Attorney General John Ashcroft 
put forth an unpublished opinion stating:  	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…arresting aliens who have violated criminal provisions of 
Immigration and Nationality Act or civil provisions that rendered 
an alien deportable, and who are listed on the [National Crime 
Information Center Database (NCIC)] – is within the authority of 
the states. The Department of Justice has no plans to seek 
additional support from state and local law enforcement in 
enforcing our nation’s immigration laws, beyond our narrow anti-
terrorism mission.126 (emphasis added) 
 
This was not only a break with the previous DOJ statement barring state and local 
law enforcement from enforcing violations of civil provisions within the INA 
(albeit with the added provision that the immigrant’s name must appear in the 
NCIC). This was also a complete break with the plenary power doctrine, as it 
rationalized state and local power, by saying this power was inherent to states’ 
sovereign entities.  
Additionally, a previously ignored portion of the INA received much more 
attention § 287(g). Under 287(g) the Attorney General may enter into a written 
agreement with state and local police qualified to investigate, apprehend and 
detain non-citizens. These officers must have knowledge of federal immigration 
laws, and have received training in enforcing those laws. Moreover this 
enforcement is defined in the agreement, and is subject to federal oversight by the 
Attorney General. Lastly, it can be revoked.127 In this manner, 287(g) 
acknowledges the federal plenary power over immigration law (with oversight 
and possible revocation), while inviting the help of state and local police.  
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Florida was the first to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) through 287(g) with the Attorney general. The scope was quite modest, 
the federal oversight was heavy, it came with a twelve-month expiration date, and 
the efforts were specifically aimed at the narrow anti-terrorism mission.128 
Alabama’s MOU was quite a bit more lenient. While there was still ICE training 
involved, supervision by ICE officers and a formal complaint program, 
Alabama’s MOU expanded immigration enforcement outside of any anti-
terrorism mission and had no expiration date.129  
The legal validity of such a broad MOU is up for debate. It can be argued 
that 287(g) by no means meant to confer such overarching immigration 
enforcement power onto the state and local police agencies. First, the INA in 
general upholds the historical understanding of the plenary power doctrine, so it is 
not in congruence with the rest of the Act. Second, as above-mentioned, this 
provision has as its base an understanding of the plenary power doctrine as 
evidenced by the limits to state and local authority set for the creation of 
MOU’s.130 Secondarily because of legal questions, and primarily because of the 
cost associated with MOU’s few states have entered into them. Arizona happens 
to be one of them.  
SB 1070 
On April 23, 2010, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed into law the 
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act commonly and 	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heretofore referred to as SB 1070. It is arguably the broadest and strictest piece of 
state immigration legislation of its time, and also the most controversial. Some 
states have passed memorial pieces of legislation heralding Arizona’s efforts and 
have even drafted similar pieces of legislation. Meanwhile, boycotts and protests 
against Arizona have erupted. It has even prompted discourse on an international 
level. The previous sections on the plenary power doctrine, preemption, and the 
power tug of war between the federal government and the state governments have 
provided a solid base on which to analyze this piece of legislation in light of each. 
This section will analyze the new crimes and new police power and 
responsibilities SB 1070 creates, as well as the constitutional issues arising with 
each.  
New Crimes. SB 1070 creates the crime of “Willful failure to complete or 
carry an alien registration document”. Stemming from and citing the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940, SB 1070 makes it a crime if a person does not “maintain 
authorization from the federal government to remain in the United States” 
(making it a crime to willfully fail or refuse to make an application under the 
Alien Registration Act) and requires that persons who have obtained a Certificate 
of Alien Registration (or receipt card) to carry it at all times.131  
 While this may sound daunting and burdensome, because it is inherently 
linked with certain federal statutes, failure to carry documents is in actuality 
difficult to violate. It is difficult to violate for the following reasons. If you are a 
legally admitted and legally residing person in the United States you do not need 	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to carry any documents, because the Arizona Revise Statutes are aimed 
specifically at unauthorized persons. If you are a legally admitted, but unlawfully 
residing person in the United States, there is no need to carry any documents, 
because there is no statute requiring persons to carry expired or invalid documents 
(which the documents would be if you entered legally, and subsequently lost the 
right to remain). Lastly, if you were not legally admitted and by extension not 
legally residing in the United States, it would not be required to carry documents, 
because the documents must have been issued to you, and the issuance of 
documents clearly does not accompany unauthorized entry.132 In light of this, the 
newly created crime is still worrisome, because courts have held in the past that 
“evidence of foreign birth plus lack of immigration documents established 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause,”133 which, of course, provides greater 
leeway for arrests. 
Failure to register is equally difficult to prosecute. If a person did not enter 
lawfully, it might be difficult to prove when exactly the person entered. This is 
important, because if the person has been in the United States less than thirty days 
he/she need not have registered already. Yet, if the person has been in the United 
States more than five years and thirty days, the statute of limitations has expired 
(although there is room for debate on when the statute of limitations begins: with 
entrance or with arrest).134  
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Moreover, failure to register is difficult to prosecute, due to the principle 
of mens rea (or guilty mind), which necessitates that a person knew of the duty to 
register and “willfully” violated this duty. This would be very difficult to 
demonstrate given: “In a prolonged discussion among a group of law professors 
who teach immigration law… no scholar was able to identify a specific 
government form or other mechanism for registration…either there is no way to 
register and the program is defunct, or the program is so obscure that even 
specialists do not know how it works.”135 
Furthermore, courts have held that statutes requiring persons to report or 
record a criminal violation (as opposed to a civil violation) violates the privilege 
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Therefore registration 
admitting the crime of entering the country illegally (as the duty to register does 
not apply to those who have entered legally) is in conflict with the Fifth 
Amendment.136 
A similar provision is thought to have created a new crime (and is 
therefore mentioned here), but in actuality does not: failure to carry not 
necessarily registration documentation, but rather identification. This presumed 
violation stems from the provision of SB 1070 stating,  
A person is presumed to not be an alien who is unlawfully present 
in the United States if the person provides to the law enforcement 
officer or agency any of the following: a valid Arizona driver’s 
license, a valid Arizona non-operating identification license, a 
valid tribal enrollment card or other form of tribal identification, if 
the entity requires proof of legal presence in the United States 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Chin et al., “A legal labyrinth,” 53. 
136 Ibid., 54. 
  61	  	  	  
 
before issuance, any valid United States federal, state, or local 
government issued identification.137 
 
This does not necessarily create a requirement that Arizona residents carry 
identification evidence of citizenship. It is merely saying that it would be wise to 
carry such documentation so that you do not have to wait in jail while your status 
is verified. Many states have a “stop and identify” statute that make it a crime (a 
class 2 misdemeanor in Arizona) to not provide your true full name to an officer if 
lawfully detained. In other words, you do not have the right to remain completely 
silent, and you would need to provide information (your name) that enables an 
officer to look you up in a database anyway.  
A crime that is indeed created by SB 1070 comes out of the section that 
reads:  
It is unlawful for an occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped on 
a street, roadway or highway to attempt to hire or hire and pick up 
passengers for work…if the motor vehicle blocks or impeded the 
normal movement of traffic. It is unlawful for a person who is 
unlawfully present in the United States… to knowingly apply for 
work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an 
employee or independent contractor in this state.138  
 
As traffic congestion is a local problem, states can and often do pass legislation in 
an attempt to ease concerns surrounding it. However, as soon as the legislation 
goes a step further to create criminal violations for hiring undocumented 
immigrants, the legislation is preempted by IRCA. IRCA states outright that it 
preempts “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than 
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for 	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a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”139 Moreover, “recent cases from a 
U.S. District Court in Arizona and another in California have invalidated 
somewhat similar local ordinances regulating solicitation from streets or 
highways on First Amendment grounds.”140 
 Yet another newly created crime is found in transporting aliens while 
committing another crime. “Transporting” includes: moving, harboring, 
concealing or shielding non-citizens, or encouraging or inducing unauthorized 
entry into Arizona.141 In addition, the person “transporting” must “know or 
recklessly disregard” the fact that the person being “transported” is an 
unauthorized immigrant.142  
 An issue with this new law is that “in violation of a criminal offense” is 
not commonly used phrasing in law construction and therefore its meaning and 
scope is unclear. There are many crimes that are considered to be continuing 
offenses, such as tax evasion and the possibly the abovementioned failure to 
register. By not merely citing federal law, but actually rewriting/tweaking an 
existing federal law, this provision implies the enactment of a new law, which 
would make violation of transportation of “illegal aliens” (for which federal legal 
precedent is inconsistent at best) a violation of Arizona law, as well. This means 
there would be additional sentencing (fines or jail time).  
 With regard to the scope of who all might be deemed to be in violation of 
“transporting” undocumented immigrants it is important to look at the 	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exemptions. The exemptions from this provision are few – those working for 
emergency medical services and those working for child protective services. This 
implies the net catching all those not exempt is quite large.143 
New Police Power and Responsibilities. “The overall point is to have 
Arizona police more involve in all phases of immigration enforcement.”144 The 
first instance of increased involvement to be analyzed is the allowance to arrest 
for any removable offense, by allowing state and local police to make an arrest 
without a warrant “if the person to be arrested has committed any public offense 
that makes the person removable from the United States.”145 At first glance this is 
redundant with existing law, because state and local police have the authority to 
make warrantless arrests (if they have probable cause) and to make arrests for 
federal crimes.146 A more in depth reading of this provision in the context of the 
statute illuminates that this could open up arrests based upon civil immigration 
warrants in the NCIC database discussed above, and the authority for such arrests 
is a heavily debated matter with precedence indicating that the authority is not 
upheld.147 
 The second instance of increased involvement is the mandatory 
investigation of suspected undocumented non-citizens. The authors of “A Legal 
Labyrinth: Issues Raised By Arizona Senate Bill 1070” summarized this provision 
well writing: 	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For any lawful stop, detention or arrest… where reasonable 
suspicion exists that the person is…unlawfully present in the 
United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when 
practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person… 
any person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration 
status determined before… released…The person’s immigration 
status shall be verified with the federal government…A person is 
presumed to not be… unlawfully present… if the person 
provides… a valid Arizona driver license… non-operating 
identification license… tribal identification… any valid United 
States federal, state or local government issued identification.148 
 
This implies that if arrested, even after providing appropriate 
identification, although a person may be presumed to not be unlawfully present, 
the immigration status of a person must be verified. Importantly, a lawful stop and 
citation (ticket for a broken taillight) is defined in Arizona as an “arrest”.149 
Therefore, merely for having a broken taillight, a person’s immigration status 
must be verified with the federal government. Proponents of the bill often tout 
that this can be done in a mere seven minutes. Conversely, federal agents charged 
with the task have countered that it only takes seven minutes if a person is already 
in the system (i.e. a visa recipient, previously deported, etc.); citizens are not in 
the system and it can take days to verify their status. This potentially means days 
of jail time for a citizen with a broken taillight or similarly menial violation.  
It is also important to note that a person can be detained without being 
suspected of a crime and the provision mandates that for any detention (as well as 
stop or arrest) a reasonable attempt shall be made to determine the immigration 
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status. Therefore without being suspected of a crime, it might still be mandatory 
that a person’s immigration status be determined.150  
The third enhancement of police power (or responsibility) lies in the duty 
to enforce the “full extent” of federal immigration law – or else (citizen suits). 
The statute reads, “No official or agency… may limit or restrict the enforcement 
of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal 
law.”151 Like many other provisions of this statute, the meaning and scope of this 
provision is a matter of debate. It may only mean that legislation and authority 
figures in police enforcement cannot hinder typical enforcement of federal 
immigration law. However, the provision (and with it the ability of a citizen to file 
a suit against a policy that limits or restricts enforcement) is potentially extremely 
broad. Someone could conceivably bring a suit merely for police officers not 
attending to every plausible violation of federal immigration law or not putting all 
of their resources toward the enforcement of federal immigration law. It might not 
hold up in court, but the point is that a citizen could tie up resources, personnel, 
and time with frivolous suits.   
Racial Profiling. One of the biggest concerns of opponents of the SB 
1070 is that it allows for, promotes, and/or intensifies racial profiling. Proponents 
of the bill state that SB 1070 explicitly protects against racial profiling in the 
following provision: “A law enforcement official or agency… may not consider 
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race, color or national origin in implementing the requirements of this subsection 
except to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona Constitution.”152 
Herein lies the problem: in the Supreme Court case of United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, it was held that the U.S. Constitution allows for race to be 
considered in immigration enforcement stating, “The likelihood that any given 
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican 
appearance a relevant factor.”153 It is important to remember that Brignoni-Ponce 
lists several factors that must be present in order to consider race. However, it 
does allow for race as a factor. Unsurprisingly, the Arizona Supreme Court has 
also affirmed the use of “ethnic factors” in enforcing immigration law.154 In 
combining all of this analysis the authors of “A Legal Labyrinth” put it best 
writing,  
It may be that S.B. 1070 actually requires racial profiling. S.B. 1070 
prohibits restricting enforcement of immigration law ‘to less than the full 
extent permitted by federal law.’ Because federal law permits race to be a 
‘relevant factor’ in determining reasonable suspicion for stops and 
inquiries, the combined effect of these provisions may be to require state 
actors to use race to the full extent permitted by federal law. If a local 
police or prosecutorial agency decides not to consider race as a factor, as a 
matter of policy, then the agency may be sued by a citizen.155 
 
Moreover, “the existing law of reasonable suspicion allows the use of 
multiple factors that are correlated with race and ethnicity,”156 among others. The 
gamut includes: “language, accent, clothing… hairstyle… neighborhood… 
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proximity to border, origin and destination of travel, the nature and location of the 
vehicle, any evasive driving or walking, nervousness, and ‘furtive behavior’”157 
Plenary Power and Preemption and Devolving Power. With regard to 
the regulation of immigration as a cause for preemption: While immigration 
regulation is exclusively a federal power under the plenary power doctrine, at 
times incidental regulation of immigration has been allowed by the Supreme 
Court. However, SB 1070 is by no means an incidental regulation.158 Moreover, 
we have seen that Congress cannot constitutionally (with regard to the reading of 
the Naturalization Clause) devolve immigration law creation and enforcement 
power onto the States. So, it cannot be inferred in any manner that the federal 
government has done so.  
Additionally, proponents of SB 1070 often tout that the state legislation is 
merely a mirror image of federal policy and the federal government should 
welcome any attempt to help them in their efforts.159 There are many problems 
with this argument. First, as we have discussed, state legislation is preempted, if 
Congress has already occupied the field. If the argument is that the state is 
enacting similar legislation, the argument admits that Congress has already 
occupied the field. Moreover, by allowing state and local police the ability to 
enforce the legislation, the legislation is inherently entirely different from federal 
legislation, which only authorizes federal agents to enforce the federal legislation. 
Even more disconcerting is the fact that the state and local enforcement could 	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conflict with federal enforcement, if  “the federal government would have 
exercised its power to decline to prosecute criminally and its statutory power to 
grant some form of relief.”160 In other words, By referencing federal statute 
without copying it exactly or simply saying that state and local police must 
enforce the federal statute, Arizona seeks to enforce something that the federal 
government can enforce but chooses by policy not to. The United States can 
deport everyone illegally present, it chooses not to because it is impractical for a 
myriad of reasons (resources, foreign relations, etc.).  
In Plyer v. Doe the Court found that Texas cannot deny education to 
children who are nevertheless subject to deportation, because there is no reason to 
believe the children will ever be deported. The children may even become citizens 
or be granted amnesty. Either way, these children enjoy “an inchoate federal 
permission to remain.”161 President Reagan’s Attorney General, William French 
Smith, spoke to this saying, “We have neither the resources, the capability, nor 
the motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of whom have 
become, in effect, members of the community.”162 
Moreover, in considering the weight this statute has upon the foreign 
policy decisions of the federal government, it is important to note that foreign 
governments have not been silent on their concerns over SB 1070. SB 1070 was 
raised as a human rights concern during the U.N. Human Rights Council's 
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Universal Periodic Review in Geneva.163 More specifically, President Calderon of 
Mexico has voiced his concern over SB 1070 to the United States Congress 
directly as did Mexico’s federal legislature.164  
It is important to remember that this speaks to one of the original 
impetuses for the creation of the plenary power doctrine or “uniform” 
immigration policy. The United States cannot afford to entrust its relations with 
foreign governments with state and local police forces, because “A silly, an 
obstinate, or a wicked [state] commissioner may bring disgrace upon the whole 
country, the enmity of a powerful nation, or the loss of an equally powerful 
friend.”165 
SB 1070 is preempted through field occupation and conflict with federal 
law for the abovementioned reasons as well as for (according to the Department 
of Justice) conflicting with the Commerce Clause (the DOJ has indicated that the 
provision in the statute making it a crime to transport, conceal, harbor or shield an 
alien is in conflict with the Commerce Clause, because “it constitutes an 
impermissible burden on the flow of commerce”166).  
Finally, if there were any doubt as to whether or not this piece of 
legislation was preempted by Congress “occupying the field” states bring that 
doubt to an end by complaining that the federal government has failed to exercise 
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its power. This is a fatally flawed argument in support of SB 1070’s 
constitutionality, because it admits that it must therefore be preempted, because 
Congress does have explicit power to enforce the laws of this statute but is 
choosing for policy reasons not to.  
However, if “Congress still remains silent, then… courts can more easily 
construe this federal silence as approval of state action by inaction and a “clear 
and manifest purpose” to occupy the field will be much harder to infer.”167 
However, the executive branch has bought the legislative branch some more time 
in their efforts by taking action; the DOJ has filed an action seeking to enjoin SB 
1070, and it continues to wind its way through the court system. 
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Chapter 3: 
THEORETICAL: MICHEL FOUCAULT 
… a book is made to be used in ways not defined by its writer. The 
more, new, possible or unexpected uses there are, the happier I 
shall be… All my books are little tool-boxes. If people want to 
open them, to use this sentence or that idea as a screwdriver or 
spanner to short-circuit, discredit systems of power, including 
eventually those from which my books have emerged… so much 
the better.168 
 
Whenever I have tried to carry out a piece of theoretical work, it 
has been on the basis of my own experiences, always in relation to 
processes I saw taking place around me. It is because I thought I 
could recognize in the things I saw, in the institutions with which I 
dealt, in my relations with others, cracks, silent shocks, 
malfunctioning… that I undertook a particular piece of work, a few 
fragments of autobiography.169 
 
 These two quotes summarize quite nicely why I and many other scholars 
have applied Michel Foucault’s work. His toolboxes have been applied to an 
endless range of topics. This thesis utilizes Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison as its primary toolbox. I will apply it to processes I see taking 
place around me, because I have come to recognize in the things I have seen, in 
the institutions, in my relations with others this book breathing.   
 At first glance, Foucault’s various toolboxes are seemingly completely 
separate ideas: insanity, sexuality, discipline, power…etc. However, there are 
themes and common threads woven throughout Foucault’s ruminations. 
Therefore, before looking at Discipline and Punish specifically, it is important to 
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contextualize it among Foucault’s other works and the broad themes found in 
Foucault’s work that make Discipline and Power so applicable.  
Foucault’s Background and Time Period 
 Foucault was born in Poitiers, France in 1926. His academic background 
was in philosophy and psychology, and he taught both along with French and 
French literature. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on Madness and Civilization 
in 1961. Probably his most often referenced works: The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison and The History of 
Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction were published in 1969, 1975 and 1984 
respectively. This timing is important in understanding the works.  
 In the early 1960s, there was an anti-authoritarian trend in political 
thought and Foucault took this tendency into the more mundane aspects of 
everyday life “who lectures to whom in universities and who does the washing up 
at home, where the personal becomes the political.”170 Foucault believed, “The 
boundary of politics has changed, and subjects like psychiatry, confinement and 
the medicalisation of a population have become political problems.”171  
 Politically, Foucault joined the French Communist Party, but his 
membership was brief. He left the party, and in fact became a staunch opponent of 
the communist party and clung to the belief that Karl Marx had been taken 
completely out of context and perverted by the times calling for “an unburdening 
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and liberation of Marx in relation to party dogma which has constrained it.”172 
Yet this should not be misconstrued as a belief that Marxism should return to its 
original state, as Foucault felt “Marxism exists in nineteenth century thought as a 
fish exists in water; that is, it ceases to breathe anywhere else.”173 Instead, 
Foucault wanted to conceptualize Marxism free of its limiting constraints to 
economics and the overbearing role of the State.174  
 His interest in prisons, which brought about Discipline and Punish was 
also evident in his founding of the Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons in the 
1970s.  “He wanted to bring about change in the prison structure, not by 
campaigning on behalf of prisoners as many liberal reformist groups had done 
before… The group organized demonstrations, discussed conditions with 
prisoners’ families outside prisons and circulated questionnaires to inmates and 
their families publishing the results in reports.”175  
 This section situates Foucault’s writings in their particular time period and 
illuminates the political will of the time, which he subscribed to (anti-
authoritarian) and reacted against (the Communist Party), as well as certain causes 
he fought for, which informed Discipline and Punish. With this backdrop, the next 
section will delve into Foucault’s writings. However, this section will not proceed 
from work to work, but rather from theme to theme as “… we can see a certain 
focus in Foucault’s work which he continually addresses and readdresses, circling 	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back to consider issues which have surface in earlier works… this notion of a set 
of concerns which he circles around is important… to give so sense of larger 
discursive frameworks within which we can try to understand his work.”176 In this 
manner, the various themes throughout his works will aid in the understanding of 
the one work, or toolbox, Discipline and Punish.  
Foucauldian Themes 
Geopolitics and Post Colonialism  
 “Geopolitical relations… have been shaped by the emergence of 
discourses and forces connected with technology, migration patterns, media 
forms, the movement of ideologies and values, flows of money… and trade…”177 
All of which, have been heavily influenced by centuries of Western colonization. 
Thus, although some might label this era as post colonial, colonialism still plays a 
large role in geopolitics.  
 The colonialism that Foucault primarily concerns himself with is not this 
exo-colonialism but rather endo-colonialism. As a prefix, endo means within or 
internal; thus, endo-colonialism is a colonization of internal territories. One such 
example is the way in which disciplinary power and the “gaze” (sometimes called 
the “colonial gaze” or the “panoptic gaze”) colonizes the body.178 Similarly, this 
thesis will discuss the ability of a panoptic gaze to colonize the body, and the 
possible reactions of the body to that gaze. 
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However, exo-colonialism cannot be ignored in this thesis, because it is so 
greatly intertwined with immigration politics. Exo-colonialism includes the 
Spanish colonization, which determined the trade routes and thus migration routes 
still in place today.  It includes the Mexican-American War and the Gadsden 
Purchase conducted between Mexico and the United States, which re-drew the 
borderlines and thus labeled some people “Mexican” and some people 
“American” – a designation that now manifests itself as “undocumented” and 
“citizen”, respectively.  
Exo-colonialism also affects the flow of migration through legislation. The 
Chinese Exclusion Act created a thirst for cheap labor previously satiated by Asia 
to be quenched by Mexico. Conversely, Senate Bill 1070 has as its core aim, 
“Attrition through Enforcement”, which means it aims to make life in Arizona so 
incredibly inhospitable to people without documentation that they will willingly 
migrate out of Arizona.  
The role of exo-colonialism in immigration politics will be delved into in 
greater detail in the next chapter, wherein the reasoning for suggesting a 
comparison and contrast of Arizona and New Mexico is given. Exo and endo 
colonial factors are both important to consider when discussing the immigration 
politics in Arizona, for it is the exo-colonialism of the region’s past that makes the 
endo-colonialism of the present possible.  
Governmentality 
“Foucault’s contribution to theories of the art of governing has been to 
draw out the links between the levels of state and global politics, on the one hand, 
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and the level of individuals and their conduct in every range of life, on the other. 
Taken together, this constitutes what he calls ‘governmentality’.”179  
While it has been mentioned that Foucault wanted to get away from the 
Marxist economic and State centered analysis. He actually wrote extensively on 
the role of the state in power relations through the lens of governmentality. This 
misunderstanding of Foucault led to the following clarifying quote:  
I don’t want to say that the State isn’t important; what I want to say 
is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made 
of them necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State… 
because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far 
from being able to occupy the whole field of actual relations, and 
further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, 
already existing power relations.180  
 
It is important here to similarly clarify and reiterate, that (in line with this 
Foucauldian thought) although illuminating State factors such as Sheriff Arpaio’s 
policing of Arizona and legislation might make it seem like this thesis aims to 
analyze the State as a cause for the panoptic gaze and its effect, the State is 
merely a readily visible and easily quantifiable symptom of the much more 
complex field of already existing power relations. This field will be expanded 
upon below. With this in mind, the focus will now turn from the broader forces of 
geopolitics and colonialism to governmentality and the Nation State.  
Foucault discusses two types of Nation State governmentality the Social 
Contract Model and the Social Warfare Model. The Social Contract Model is, of 
course, based upon the social contract theory of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. It 	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is the idea that people gave up the freedom inherent in a state of nature for the 
protection and benefits derived from having a government, and that therefore: 
“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed”  
The problem with this idea, of course, is that we have not each 
individually agree to this contract. Libertarians would like to see far less 
government intervention and far more of their naturally derived freedom, whereas 
socialists swing to the other end of the delicate balance between freedom and 
government protection/benefits. “Theorists have to set up a make-believe time, a 
political fantasy, when the rule of sovereign law was ‘agreed’ to.”181 Moreover, 
not everyone is allowed to join in the social contract. “These practices of 
‘contracting in’ certain groups and excluding others have been central to the 
development of virtually every social order. Who legitimately belongs to a 
community can only be judged on the basis of knowing who is excluded. These 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion are subject to shifts over time.”182 Borders 
change; programs/laws are enacted that change activities from “legal” to “illegal”.  
The problems for the social contract model in analyzing governmentality 
in Arizona encompass the abovementioned problem that we did not each 
individually contract into this system, and the fact that some in Arizona are 
excluded from contracting in. Even if we did at some “make-believe time” agree 
to our social contract, our social contract (the Constitution) is not being upheld. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Danaher, Understanding Foucault, 84. 
182 Ibid., 85. 
  78	  	  	  
 
its original form, it sets up three distinct branches of government that are 
supposed to act as checks and balances. In spite of this, the history of federal 
immigration law detailed in the previous chapter shows how immigration law has 
become exempt from judicial review and is no longer forced to reconcile with our 
social contract/Constitution. Thus the argument can be made that the social 
contract has been broken.  
With regard to state immigration law, if it is allowed (which in many less 
extreme cases, state immigration legislation goes uncontested) it goes against the 
way our social contract has been interpreted through the plenary power doctrine 
and preemption, and thus breaks the social contract with the people. Additionally, 
the problem that some are excluded from contracting into this governmentality is 
put in extreme perspective in Arizona, wherein immigration legislation and the 
power to enforce immigration regulation is directed explicitly and exclusively 
upon a population that cannot contract into this social contract model.  
The Social Warfare Model is based upon the idea that “… a group or 
groups seize power, establish themselves as dominant in a society, and set up the 
state in terms of their own ideas, values and self-interest…Of course this social 
warfare is ongoing so one group can be overthrown by another, which then sets 
about rewriting history, the law, rights and values in order to keep themselves in 
power.”183 For example, Sheriff Arpaio did not originally concentrate upon 
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undocumented immigration, and even dubbed it a waste of time, until it bumped 
him in the polls.184  
 In this way Sheriff Arpaio becomes a symbol of the hegemony of elites in 
Arizona. As Gramsci termed it, “hegemony… explains how states and state 
institutions work to win popular consent for their authority through a variety of 
processes which disguise their position of dominance.” For example, politicians 
and influential elites can and sometimes do disguise programs and legislation that 
merely cement a particular group’s dominance in society as legitimate “common 
sense” arguments by telling people that it is simply “wrong” to do anything 
illegal. Thus “illegal” (as the ones in power have termed it) border crossing is 
“wrong”. Doing something wrong warrants punishment. Therefore, by the 
transitive property, illegal border crossing should be punished. The part that few 
question is the fact that someone invented the law deeming it illegal to cross the 
border without consent, and that law can be questioned or changed, so that the 
action in question is no longer illegal. Such laws cement a particular group’s 
dominance.   
Taking it out of the context of immigration, if those in power used the 
same logic and deemed it “illegal” to eat over 2,000 calories a day, and therefore 
eating over 2,000 calories a day is “wrong” and should therefore be punished – 
people would question those in power deeming eating over 2,000 calories a day 
“illegal”, which is typically what happens when a government rations food. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Ted Robbins, “‘America’s Toughest Sheriff’ Takes on Immigration,” Morning Edition 
(National Public Radio, March 10, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88002493. 
  80	  	  	  
 
However, even then, some people trust the government that the food must be 
rationed. The same is true of borders. People trust the government that there must 
be borders and mechanism for allowing or disallowing the entry of people.  
“While Foucault agrees that governments exploit and repress people while 
pretending to be just and fair, he doesn’t think that societies and governments are 
always characterized by warfare directed by one group against another. Foucault 
suggests that, within societies, power circulates and people are dominated and 
repressed, but it’s more complex than simply identifying who are the oppressors, 
and who are the oppressed.”185 In part, Foucault believes this because power is 
fluid and because we all have multifaceted identities and identify with various 
identities’ power depending on the circumstance. In other words, it is not merely 
between republicans and democrats, but rather the shifting power between various 
corporations, organizations, groups and even individuals.  
Similarly, this can be found in Arizona. To an outside observer, 
immigration politics may look like warfare directed by one group against another, 
but truth be told, no one in Arizona can escape the effects of immigration politics 
and many get involved for multitudinous reasons. Immigration politics plays in 
the realm of shifting power between corporations, organizations, groups and 
individuals. There are corporations leveraging pressure against SB 1070, because 
of a desire for cheap labor in Arizona and there are corporations outside of 
Arizona who are boycotting the state for moral/ethical reasons. There are 
organizations fighting against SB 1070 and for the civil liberties at risk under this 	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particular piece of legislation, and there are organizations instituting “buycotts” in 
order to show their support for the Arizona legislation as they attempt to pass 
similar legislation in other states. There are smaller groups on either side of the 
immigration political divide throwing their political weight behind various 
organizations or corporations for their own reasons. There are individuals from 
the prominent activist, Salvador Reza, to the author of the bill, Russell Pearce, 
wielding whatever community ties and technologies they have at their disposal.  
Finding flaws in both the Social Contract and the Social Warfare models, 
Foucault discusses, “… a movement from focusing on who has power and 
influence to a rationality based on how power can be exercised most 
efficiently.”186 This efficient power maximizes the prosperity of the state, which 
Foucault dubs “the reason of state”. In order to achieve the ultimate prosperity of 
the state, government adopts “technologies of governmentality” and takes on the 
pastoral care of its citizens.  
Foucault reasoned, “The Christian institution of pastorship ], with its 
continuous exercise of power over the lives of individuals achieved through ‘the 
organization of a link between total obedience, knowledge of oneself, and 
confession to someone else’, constitutes an important chapter in the history of the 
government of individuals.”187 He explains this in part by comparing Christian 
pastorship and pastorship as a technology of governmentality. In Christianity 
pastoriship assures individual salvation in the next world, whereas government 
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ensures a secular salvation of individuals by providing health, well-being, 
security…etc. Christian pastorship looks after not only the whole community but 
each individual, as does the State through the diffusion of pastoral power to 
figures in public and private institutions (police, universities, philanthropic 
organizations, medical institutions, etc.). Lastly, just as Christian pastorship 
“requires for its exercise a knowledge of people’s minds, their souls and secrets 
and details of their actions; a knowledge of conscience and an ability to direct 
it,”188 so too does governmentality. The State acquires this knowledge not 
through confessionals as in the Christian tradition but rather through “the 
production of knowledges that would allow the state to scientifically analyse that 
population, which was followed by the introduction of policies that both regulated 
behavior (for the good of the individual… the good of the state), and kept the 
population happy and healthy – and therefore production.”189 This is called 
biopolitics.  
In this manner, although Foucault ardently held that analyzing the exercise 
of power should not begin with the false premise that the State encompasses and 
wields all power, “the importance of the modern state as both the ‘political form 
of centralized and centralizing power’ is both acknowledged and addressed. An 
evident centralization of political power in the form of the modern state does not 
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however, exhaust the history of relations of power.”190 As Michel Foucault 
himself put it: 
… neither the caste which governs, nor the groups which control 
the state apparatus, nor those who make the most important 
economic decisions direct the entire network of power that 
functions in a society… the rationality of power is characterized by 
tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted leave where 
they are inscribed… tactics which, becoming connected to one 
another, but finding their base of support and their condition 
elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems; the logic is 
perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case 
that no one is there to have invented them.191 
 
It seems that Arizona is hiding behind the false premise that it adheres to 
the Social Contract Model envisioned by the forefathers of this nation, and 
dealing with the reality of a Social Warfare Model (not between two groups as a 
classical reading of the Social Warfare Model suggests, but rather among every 
corporation, organization, group and individuals in Arizona). Unknowingly, this 
forces Arizona to try to maintain some semblance of pastoral control through it all 
by utilizing technologies of power to keep the population happy, healthy and 
productive. These technologies of power will be expanded upon later in this 
paper.  
Introduction to Power 
This section serves to introduce Foucault main ideas concerning power, 
which will be expanded upon in the following sections: reaction to Marx, 
resistance, biopower, discipline, the Panopticon and the carceral network.  
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The question of power remains a total enigma. Who exercises 
power? And in what sphere? We now know with reasonable 
certainty who exploits others, who receives the profits, which 
people are involved… But as for power… We should… investigate 
the limits imposed on the exercise of power – the relays through 
which it operates and the extent of its influence on the often 
insignificant aspects of the hierarchy and the forms of control 
surveillance, prohibition and constraint. Everywhere that power 
exists, it is being exercised. No one, strictly speaking, has an 
official right to power; and yet it is always exerted in a particular 
direction, with some people on one side and some on the other.192  
 
This quote from Michel Foucault is a wonderful beginning to a look at his 
ruminations on power, because it illuminates how he broke with looking at power 
as something to be possessed, and saw power rather as a fluid, pervasive force 
throughout society wielded and performed by everyone in some manner.  
Foucault called this web of power relationships a “complex strategical 
[sic] situation” and a “multiplicity of force relations”. For proposed idea for a 
study, this is an important concept to bear in mind, as it is not necessarily an 
institution or structure wielding power as a noun over a group of people as an 
object. Instead, I am positing that immigration legislation is emblematic of the 
“complex strategical [sic] situation” and “multiplicity of force relations” under 
which immigration legislation is created by a society. 
In an additional break with traditional analysis of power, while Foucault 
did not deny that the State wields and exercises power, he subscribed to a bottom-
up model of power. This model proposed that power does not originate in the 
State and trickle down through various echelons to the people. Rather this micro-
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level model, “enables an account of the mundane and daily ways in which power 
is enacted and contested, and allows an analysis which focuses on individuals as 
active subjects, as agents rather than as passive dupes.”193  
Importantly, Foucault stressed, “Where there is power, there is resistance”. 
In fact, he believed that “power depends for its existence on the presence of a 
‘multiplicity of points of resistance’ and that the plurality of resistances should 
not be reduced to a single locus of revolt or rebellion. 
Likewise, as discussed above, it is the multiplicities of force relations 
exerted by some corporations, organizations, groups and individuals in a tangled 
web of power relationships with other corporations, organizations, groups and 
individuals representing the multiplicity of points of resistance. It is nothing more 
than an example of Newton’s third law of physics: for every action there is an 
equal and opposite reaction.  
After conceptualizing power as such, Foucault focused upon two main 
questions: “What are the technologies of power?” or “How is it exercised?” and 
“What are the effects of exercised power?”  
Reaction to Marx 
 Not only did Foucault break with Marx’s State centered macro-
institutional level of analysis of power in adhering to a bottom-up model of 
power, Foucault also distanced himself from Marx in refusing to look at power 
from strictly economic terms. Moreover, Foucault actually argued against an 
analysis of power relationships and revolt from a macro and economically divided 	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perspective of class struggle against a bourgeois power in an attempt to secure 
freedom from oppression, because, “the State consists in the codification of a 
whole number of power relations which render its functioning possible, and … 
revolution is a different type of codification of the same relations.”194  
Foucault argues that many struggles “‘of administration over the way 
people live’ are characterized…as being ‘local’ or ‘immediate’ struggles, since 
they are instances in which people are criticizing the immediate conditions of 
their lives and the way that certain people, groups or institutions are acting on 
their lives… ‘the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much such 
and such an institution of power, or group, or elite, or class, but rather a 
technique, a form of power’”195 He also believed that such “speculative” 
adversaries and “global solutions set in a distant future (e.g. liberations, 
revolutions, end of class struggle) assume a relative insignificance.”196 
Therefore, Foucault moved away from the Marxist study of class struggle 
and analyzed the power of “men over women, of parents over children, of 
psychiatry over the mentally ill, of medicine over the population, of 
administration over the ways peoples live”.197  
This can certainly be seen in Arizona. The “dissidents” are not necessarily 
against having a legislative body; they are not against the republican party as a 
whole, although it was drafted by the republican party; the people are not 
revolting against an elite class; some are not even necessarily dissatisfied with 	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those who passed or signed the bill entirely. Instead, the reaction is against a 
technique – a form of power legislated through SB 1070. It is against the 287(g) 
agreement. It is against how this piece of legislation is used as a technique or form 
of power to give additional techniques and forms of power to the police for 
immigration law enforcement. It is how this technique of power will change the 
power relationships in daily encounters. It is how it will make it terrifying to drop 
their child off at school or go to the grocery store.198 It is how this technique of 
power might make it impossible for a father (who would normally solicit work on 
a street corner) to put food on the table. It is the change SB 1070 creates in the 
power dynamic between a cop and the person being pulled over, between an 
employer and a potential employee. 
 In this way, it is also not a speculative adversary or global solutions set in 
a distant future. It is not calling for a complete overhaul of the American political 
system, or calling for a world in which there are no borders anywhere. It is asking 
to not be harassed in the immediate future.  
Resistance 
“Where there is power, there is resistance.”199 Albeit of simple 
construction, this statement is pregnant with meaning. In part, Foucault means to 
say that the exercise of power is accompanied by a reaction, for as Foucault put it, 
“it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it 
constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an 	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acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of 
action.”200  
However, simple statement above has been misinterpreted to mean, 
“resistance is always and already colonized by power… and thereby is doomed to 
defeat. Such an objection is anticipated in Foucault’s observation that although 
resistances exist by virtue of the strategic field of power relations, this does not 
mean that they ‘doomed to perpetual defeat’, on the contrary they constitute an 
‘irreducible opposite’ of power relations.”201  
Resistance is not the absence of power, it is a reaction to power and can 
connote strength. Moreover, Foucault purports extensively that power is fluid and 
thus ever flowing, therefore the weight of power can shift rapidly into the hands 
of the “resisters” and be resisted by those who exercised power previously.  
This can be seen in the current petition for a recall of Russell Pearce. 
Those who might have been seen as “resisters” colonized by the power Russell 
Pearce exercised upon them, have used the legal channels (or technologies of 
power) at their disposal to canvass throughout Russell Pearce’s district to collect 
enough votes to force a recall election in the fall.202 If there is a recall election, 
the power will have swiftly flowed back into the hands of the “resisters”, and he 
may be removed from his privileged position and thus unable to exercise as much, 
or the same type of, power.  	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 Moreover, Foucault was adamant that resistance is not confined to revolt 
or popular uprisings. However, I would like to add that I do not agree with the 
above statement, “In the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely,” because 
there never ceases to be resistance even if a person or group of people succumb to 
the behavior discipline has dictated, the body resists at a very visceral level of 
chronic stress.  
[Chronic stress] has a variety of physiological consequences, 
including hyperglycemia … type II diabetes mellitus, 
and hypertension (high blood pressure), which can lead 
to cardiovascular disease… poor concentration, mood swings, 
agitation, depression, and anxiety. In addition, long-term stress-
induced cortisol secretion from the adrenal glands can depress 
immune function, leading to increased risk of illness. High levels 
of cortisol also are associated with weight gain, particularly with 
the accumulation of excess abdominal fat.203  
 
Therefore, it is my contention that when power is experienced, resistance enters 
the body. Foucault believes power is inflicted on the body in another fashion – 
biopower.  
Biopower 
 Biopower finds expression through technologies born of the human 
sciences. Human sciences gave those wielding power greater insight into how to 
most efficiently control, regulate and define the human body, and the behavior it 
exhibits. The goal of those exercising biopower is to render the body “docile and 
productive and, thus politically and economically useful.”204 Taken a step further: 
The basic idea of biopower is to produce self-regulating subjects… 
once our bodies and minds have been formed and formulated in 	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particular ways, we then take it upon ourselves to make sure that 
we function in these ways, and remain good, healthy subjects. 
Schools, universities, psychologists, the courts, businesses and the 
police can only keep us under surveillance some of the time.205 
 
Therefore, while power is often thought of in negative terms, power in 
general and biopower specifically and especially should be thought of in 
productive terms. In so doing, Foucault argues that biopower aided in the 
development of capitalism, because it produced a “healthy, active, disciplined 
population as a workforce; and… the… detailed and function-specific 
arrangements of space and people… provided the organizational models for 
nineteenth century factories.”206 
Another form of production is found in the categorization of individuals. 
Biopower creates deviants. Utilizing the social sciences, activities and attributes 
were labeled as abnormal, “the pervert, the deviant, the trouble-maker, the 
problem child, the homosexual, the hysteric, the kleptomania, the pyromaniac, the 
psychotic.”207 Once peopled are categorized, their “ailments” can be identified 
and they can be disciplined back into good, healthy subjects.  
Unfortunately, proponents of Arizona’s immigration legislation have 
sought through “Attrition through Enforcement” to force people out of the State 
and (for them, ideally) out of the Country, because they will feel constantly 
harassed and “surveilled” into “good behavior”. In this instance “good behavior” 
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is not being present in this State without being authorized to be present in this 
State.  
 Arizona is participating in creating deviants through biopower. Through 
SB 1070, Arizona is creating new crimes and therefore new classes of criminals 
and deviants. Moreover, the degree to which law enforcement officials would be 
forced to consider ethnic attributes under SB 1070 in an arrest also labels certain 
activities (listening to the Spanish radio station) and attributes (perhaps a certain 
hairstyle or clothing choice) “abnormal” for an acculturated American and 
therefore suspected of being “undocumented”. Being “disciplined back into good, 
healthy subjects” in this situation, means either removal from Arizona, or being 
forced to hide any incriminating activities or attributes.  
Discipline 
Discipline is the means by which biopower is wielded. Discipline’s 
“objective became the economy, efficiency and internal organization of 
movements; and the exercise of power was to be constant and regular so as to 
effect an uninterrupted supervision of the processes of activity.”208 Foucault 
maintains that this discipline is achieved through hierarchical observation, 
normalizing judgment, and examination.  
 Hierarchical observation is coercion by observation, wherein the people to 
whom the observation is applied are visible along with all of their actions, and 
there is knowledge of this observation. It akin to children misbehaving when a 
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teacher steps out of the classroom, and returning to good behavior once the 
teacher has reentered the room.  
 Normalizing judgment utilizes societal norms to define what is normal and 
what is abnormal (i.e. “the pervert, the deviant, the trouble-maker, the problem 
child…the psychotic, etc.”209). Falling outside the parameters of what is 
considered normal is deemed undesirable for society and thus for the person who 
is considered abnormal, as well. Normalizing judgment is a prerequisite for 
discipline, because non-conformity must be defined before the exercise of 
disciplinary power can be utilized in order to correct it. Continuing on with the 
classroom metaphor, it might be completely normal for children in a kindergarten 
classroom to behave in a manner that would be considered abnormal for children 
in a second grade classroom. Moreover, the children are made aware of what is 
considered normal and abnormal behavior.  
 Examination combines hierarchical observation and normative judgment 
to create a normalizing gaze, which differentiates them and judges them. This 
gaze is pervasive and constant, because it is internalized. It is the situation in 
which the children of the classroom are unsure whether or not they are being 
watched, and so they regulate their own behavior.  
 These schoolhouse examples were chosen deliberately in order to 
demonstrate that there are incredibly productive and helpful usages of discipline. 
Discipline, even as Foucault describes it, is not necessarily a negative usage of 
power. It simply happens that the principles of discipline at work in Arizona’s 	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immigration legislation have a negative impact. Other instances of this same 
technology of power can be arguably incredibly important in our modern society.  
Foucault summarized the culmination of these three elements into 
discipline perfectly in Discipline and Punish: 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them 
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power 
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes 
the principle of his own subjection. By this very fact, the external 
power may throw of its physical weight; it tends to the non-
corporal; and, the more it approaches this limit, the more constant, 
profound and permanent are its effects: it is a perpetual victory that 
avoids any physical confrontation and which is always decided in 
advance.210 
 
With regard to the reasoning behind the suggestion looking at the 
perception of a “gaze” in the next chapter: the more pervasive immigration 
legislation is, and the more people come to believe that it means they are being 
watched, the less the immigration legislation will even have to be enforced in 
order to ensure that this panoptic gaze remains. The panoptic gaze will be 
“constant, profound and permanent” in its effects. This, of course, means the 
structural violence caused by the panoptic gaze will be “constant, profound, and 
permanent” in its effects.  
In addition to being an activist for prisoner’s rights, Foucault believed that 
the prison was a prime example of this disciplinary power, and thus enters 
Foucault’s book: Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison.  
The History of Punishment and Prison 	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 Discipline and punish historicizes in Foucault’s unique manner the shift in 
the way societies punish people deemed to be criminals. The book begins with the 
description of a particularly gruesome execution of a man accused of attempted 
regicide. He is made to hold a torch of hot wax. Flesh is torn from his “breast, 
thighs and calves with red-hot pincers”.211 His right hand burnt with sulphur. 
“Molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur melted together”212 
were poured on his open wounds. He was drawn and quartered, and the burned to 
ashes. Unfortunately for the condemned, none of these steps went according to 
plan. His skin was too difficult to tear in one try, and the drawing and quartering 
was attempted for a half an hour, before he was hacked to pieces to make it easier. 
This horribly graphic depiction is then juxtaposed with a tidy list of a prisoner’s 
daily activities only eighty years later encompassing prayer, work, meals, and 
even school. 
 He traces how this came to pass writing: 
… reformers began to express criticism of the excessive violence 
and social divisiveness… with prevailing penal practices. Public 
executions came to be regarded as both ineffective in deterring 
crime and likely to lead to social disturbance… The objective of 
the reforms appears thereby to be not so much leniency and 
humanity as a new economy of punishment, a greater efficiency … 
to ‘increase its effect while diminishing its economic cost… and its 
political cost’ The new order of punishment formulated by the 
reformers was based upon a conception of crime as an offence not 
against the…will of the sovereign but against society… The aim of 
punishment thereby became both a redress for the offence 
committed against society…and a restoration of the offender 
within society.213  	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 It is important to note, as was done above in discussing Foucault’s 
approach to history, that this is only a shift in the way societies punish people 
deemed to be criminals. It is neither an improvement, nor a progression; it is 
merely different. This change was done, “…not to punish less, but to punish 
better.”214 It is additionally important to note that, although the body was not the 
central object toward which punishment was directed and inflicted, the body 
remained and remains penalized, “confined… forced to labour… sexual 
deprivation, and to a series of other controls and regulations.”215 It is also the site 
of internalized stressing the body and the symptoms associated with chronic stress 
listed above.  
 In tying this back in to discipline. The prison used the concepts of 
discipline as outlined above to achieve the increased efficiency. Moreover, the 
prison utilized the knowledges of the human sciences to achieve this discipline 
and efficiency. “The emergence of the institution of the prison as the paradigmatic 
form of punishment was in consequence conceived by Foucault to be associated 
with the development of a disciplinary technology of power and related forms of 
knowledge.”216 However, there was one particular prison design that Foucault 
believed to best represent the embodiment of a disciplinary technology of power – 
the Panopticon.   
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The Panopticon 
Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon is an architectural design intended for a 
more economical means of running a prison in particular, but more broadly 
“work-houses, or manufactories, or mad-houses, or hospitals, or schools,”.217 The 
theoretical foundation for the architectural design, and therefore also for its 
expanded application upon society is embodied in the following quote: 
 …in all these instances, the more constantly the persons to be 
inspected are under the eyes of the persons who should inspect 
them, the more perfectly will the purpose of the establishment have 
been attained. Ideal perfection…would require the each should 
actually be in that predicament during every instant of time. This 
being impossible, the next thing to be wished for is, that, at every 
instant, seeing reasons to believe as much, and not being able to 
satisfy himself to the contrary, he should conceive himself to be 
so.218  
 
In other words, Jeremy Bentham had created a blueprint for a 1984 “Big 
Brother”-like structure in the year 1787. The genius lay in the simplicity, 
economy and generalizability of the architectural design. In the application of the 
prison, the entire structure would be circular. The cells would form the periphery 
and face inward toward a single watchtower. Walls separate prisoners from each 
other and light enters through a window at the back of the cell shining toward the 
tower. In this way, the prisoners are backlit and every anonymous movement is 
visible to the tower. Likewise the tower is visible, yet the inhabitants within the 
tower are conversely invisible and thus, unverifiable. In this design, a prisoner 
never knows if or by whom he/she is being watched. Thus the Panopticon 
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employs simple geometric angles, and economical usage of a tower instead of a 
multitude of guards.   
In summarizing the effect of this design, Foucault wrote: 
As a result individuals became entangled in an impersonal power 
relation, one which automatized and disindividualized power as it 
individualized those subject to it. Thus it became unnecessary ‘to 
use force to constrain the convict to good behaviour, the madman 
to calm, to worker to work, the schoolboy to application, the 
patient to the observation of the regulations… He who is subjected 
to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for 
the constraints of power, he makes them play spontaneously upon 
himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he 
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his 
own subjection.’219  
 
Immigration legislation creates the thought that someone could be 
watching at all times and it is this perceived panoptic gaze that spurs a behavior 
change (either a conscious, external and thus visible behavior change or an 
unconscious, internal and thus invisible to the naked eye behavior change). Many 
of us slow our speed on the highway when we see a police car, but if you believe 
you personally are being watched extra carefully (because of certain “ethnic 
factors” you might believe yourself to exhibit) by police (which may be 
undercover in civilian vehicles), you might always monitor the your own speed on 
the highway very cautiously.  
The Panopticon is a technology of discipline and of power (more 
specifically biopower). Therefore there should be resistance. Some critics have 
cited as a problem that “description of disciplinary regimes is that the individual 
subject is seen to be subjected to the point where resistance to these practices and 	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procedures is futile, so ingrained are they in the individual themselves. This seems 
to conflict with Foucault’s ideas developed in The History of Sexuality, where he 
states that where there is power there is resistance.”220  
Here, again, I would like to offer the following reconciliation. Foucault 
does seem to go back and forth as to whether or not resistance must be present in 
a power relationship (as the Panopticon certainly is a power relationship and yet 
he only speaks of conformity). However, internally the body has a documented 
response to the heightened stress of oppression and constant vigilance, and that 
bodily response is the body’s form of internal resistance to the power imposed 
upon it. Changing your behavior because of a power relationship such as that of 
the Panopticon, wherein power is exerted by planting the seed in someone’s mind 
that they might be at any point being watched, or purposefully not changing your 
behavior as a form of deviance, or changing your behavior but not in a compliant 
way but rather in a manner that rails against the power regime – any of these 
responses are reactions to feeling watched. No matter which route the individual 
takes in responding to the panoptic-gaze, it is a response, either consciously or 
subconsciously. It is for this reason that in the discussion of future empirical 
research to follow, it is not suggested that the researcher look at the behavioral 
response to feeling watched. It is of greater importance to discover whether or not 
that panoptic-gaze is experienced, regardless of how that experience may make 
someone react externally, because if someone feels watched there will be a 
reaction of resistance internally to the heightened and chronic stress.  	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“Foucault explained that he reached an appreciation of punishment and the 
prison as belonging to a political technology of the body not from history but 
from revolts and resistances occurring in prisons through the world in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.”221 Thus, although Foucault believed the Panopticon to 
regulate behavior, even he knew that the behavioral component was merely a 
reaction to power. Whether it was compliant with the disciplinary forces or 
resisting, there is a behavioral reaction to being watched, but it is not necessarily 
the same for all individuals. Therefore, it would be futile to attempt to analyze the 
behaviors of the population being studied, because an extreme range of behaviors 
may be said to be reactions to the panoptic gaze, and it is not for the researcher to 
determine which actions are more or less of a reaction than others. A reaction 
from one person might not differ too much from their normal temperament, while 
that same reaction from another person might be an extreme shift from their 
normal temperament. Moreover, the reaction might be an internal bodily reaction, 
in which case it is about bodily behavior (perhaps hormone secretion) that would 
necessitate an entirely different and medical study.  
Lastly, in analyzing the Panopticon, technologies of discipline are once 
again tied to the production knowledge in that, “In addition to subjecting 
individuals to the power of observation the Panopticon also functioned as a 
laboratory… a site for the production of knowledge about those under 
observation, and a place for experimentation and training.”222 This can be seen in 
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Arizona; political proponents of strict immigration legislation and enforcement 
fabricate “knowledge” by offering statistics showing a positive correlation 
between a rise in the number of supposed undocumented persons in a state and a 
rise in the crime rate. Similarly, studies have been done citing the opposite, or 
showing that actually undocumented persons are much less likely to commit 
crimes than citizens.223 Either way, people on either side of the issue are 
attempting to observe a particular group in society in order to isolate and monitor 
the actions, and create “knowledge” about that group.  
 While Bentham asserts the generalizability of his design to the 
abovementioned prisons, houses of industry, work-houses, poor-houses, 
lazarettos, manufactories, hospitals, mad-houses, and schools, Michel Foucault 
believes it to have even more generalizability. He writes: 
Bentham dreamt of transforming into a network of mechanisms 
that would be everywhere and always alert, running through 
society without interruption in space or in time. The panoptic 
arrangement provides the formula for the generalization.224 
 
The Panopticon… must be understood as a generalizable model of 
functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the 
everyday life of men… the Panopticon must not be understood as a 
dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced 
to its ideal form… it is in fact a figure of political technology that 
may and must be detached from any specific use.225 
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The Carceral Network 
 The Panopticon was the perfected disciplinary technology, and albeit with 
modification the same technology could be applied in a “whole series of 
institutions… well beyond the frontiers of criminal law.”226 “Foucault has 
described the series of institutions and organizations employing disciplinary 
techniques of normalizations as a ‘carceral network’…[which] effects a linkage 
between legal forms of punishment and the most minute forms of 
correction…with [this]… a normalizing power spread through the entire social 
body.”227 
 This carceral network occurred because of four processes in particular: “(i) 
an expansion of disciplinary institutions, (ii) the emergency of positive and 
productive disciplines, (iii) the de-institutionalization of disciplinary mechanisms, 
(iv) the organization of a police apparatus.”228 The expansion of disciplinary 
institutions merely means that a form of discipline became a typical form of 
organization in a variety of institutions (“the organization and practices of 
military hospitals constituted the model for hospital reorganization in general in 
the eighteenth century”229). Emergency of positive and productive disciplines 
simply speaks to a shift in society from merely punishing and working against 
certain actions to attempting to generate productive individuals who contribute 
positively to society. De-institutionalization of disciplinary mechanisms, is the 	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disciplining of those not actually institutionalized (or inside the parameters of the 
institution). Foucault uses Christian schools as an example, in that information 
about the parents is gathered concerning life-styles, morals “creating in effect a 
form of indirect supervision and surveillance over a non-institutionalized 
population.”230 Of course the organization of a police apparatus means that even 
if you belong to a non-institutionalized population (you are not incarcerated) you 
are still subject to “unceasing surveillance, the reporting and documentation of the 
behaviour of individuals through the entire social body performed by the 
institution of the police.” 231 
 In this manner, the carceral network has placed everyone in society in a 
Panopticon of sorts. However, the panoptic gaze is focused more intensely on 
various populations at various times, depending on the politics and relations of 
power. Currently, the panoptic gaze in Arizona is focused intensely upon the 
Latino population. The following sections will demonstrate the spread of a 
carceral network in Arizona.  
Minutemen. It is no surprise that coming across the border one might see 
Border Patrol Agents or even National Guard troops. As far back as 1904, “the 
Commissioner General of Immigration appointed seventy-six inspectors who 
monitored the border on horseback.”232 However, today such appointment is not 
always necessary. Some United States citizens are flocking to the border in an 
attempt to take matters into their own hands. These citizens have created their 	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own carceral network spanning the countryside in attempt to “help” federal 
Border Patrol Agents. They call themselves Minutemen, alluding to members of 
the colonial militia who were quickly and easily deployed at a moment’s notice. 
Today’s Minutemen look slightly different: “In the spring and summer of 2005, a 
few hundred anti-immigrant activists brought guns, binoculars, cell phones, 
sunscreen, lawn chairs, and beer coolers to border areas, first in Arizona…”233 
The Minuteman Project is now accompanied by approximately sixty “spin-off 
groups”.234 These groups claim to be patriots, whose only goal is to watch for 
illegal crossings and report to the Border Patrol, but in reality these groups have 
been far less innocent.  
 Yet these groups are being made to appear as a mainstream viewpoint in 
the media, or at least the media is not exposing the racism and violence behind the 
Minuteman Project. Representative Tom Tancredo and CNN anchor Lou Dobbs 
have given the Minutemen a voice in the legislature and have praised their efforts 
on CNN, respectively. “CNN put Dobbs on camera as an immigration expert… in 
a stretch from his show to The Situation Room With Wolf Blitzer; Larry King 
Live; Anderson Cooper 360, and so on, providing a full evening of rabid anti-
immigrant mania.”235 
These groups have absorbed neo-Nazis previously without a “mainstream” 
home, people “who openly advocate for the assassination, lynching, and murder 
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of Blacks, Latinos, and other minorities.”236 The American Civil Liberties Union 
analyzed 581 articles and editorials regarding Minutemen and concluded that 
there was “‘an underreporting of participation and promotion of the Minuteman 
Project from the white supremacist community’; and an almost complete omission 
of the ‘violence and illegal activity’ perpetrated by the Minutemen.”237  
Yet there has been violence. The Border Guardians of Tucson, Arizona 
advocate tactics such as, “steal[ing] the money from any illegal walking into a 
bank or check-cashing place” and “creat[ing] an anonymous propaganda 
campaign warning that any further illegal immigrants coming here will be shot, 
maimed, or seriously messed-up upon crossing the border.”238 A group called the 
Ranch Rescue is being charged with holding immigrants at gunpoint, pistol-
whipping immigrants, and harassing immigrants with trained attack dogs.  
While the Minutemen Civil Defense Corp based in Arizona disbanded in 
the spring of 2010, the reasoning the President of the group (Carmen Mercer) 
gave is alarming. 
Mercer sent out an e-mail urging members to come to the border 
“locked, loaded and ready” and urged people to bring “long arms.” 
She proposed changing the group’s rules to allow members to track 
illegal immigrants and drug smugglers instead of just reporting the 
activity to the Border Patrol…Mercer said she received a more 
feverish response than she expected — 350 personal e-mails she 
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said — and decided the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps couldn’t 
shoulder the responsibility and liability of what could occur.239 
 
Moreover, only the national chapter has disbanded. The local Minutemen 
groups have been encouraged to continue to fight, and the violence has not ended. 
In May of 2009, the then Executive Director of Minutemen Civil Defense Corp 
and founder of Minutemen American Defense (M.A.D.) executed a plan with two 
others to kill and rob a family of three, who she suspected to be in the United 
States illegally and to possess drugs. The father and nine-year-old girl were killed. 
Yet, is this horrifying reality confined to a narrow strip in southern Arizona? Is 
there greater security once a person escapes untrained vigilantes and is in the 
jurisdiction of a trained professional police force? No.  
Sheriff Arpaio. At the heart of Arizona, is Maricopa County, which 
naturally encompasses the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (MCSO) headed by 
the infamous Sheriff Joe Arpaio, or “America’s Toughest Sheriff.” He is either 
the toughest or simply the most eccentric, and it seems he has anyone who crosses 
him, in his crosshairs. Indeed, there seems be a to chilling comparison to Pastor 
Niemöller’s often quoted assessment of the progression of the Nazi party: 
First they came for the socialists, and I didn't speak out because I 
was not a socialist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I 
didn't speak out because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came 
for the Jews, and I didn't speak out because I was not a Jew. Then 
they came for me, and there was no one left to speak out for me.240 
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Michael Lacey (editor in chief of the Phoenix New Times and critic of Sheriff 
Arpaio) parodied, “You begin with prisoners. Then you move on to Mexicans. 
Then you move on to editors and reporters.”241  
 With regard to treatment of prisoners, Sheriff Arpaio is known for his 
“Tent City”, which he himself has likened to a concentration camp.242 
Approximately 2,000 inmates live outside through blistering Arizona desert 
summer days, and frigid Arizona desert winter nights. Inmates are fed rotting 
food, and made to wear pink underwear.243 The International Human Rights 
community has come down on Arpaio for his use of chain gangs and for the 
shackling of women’s hands and feet during child labor.244  
Arpaio has also employed outlandish means of conducting arrests 
including bombarding a neighborhood with tanks, a swat team, and a bomb squad 
to arrest an unarmed man accused of cockfighting and euthanize over one hundred 
birds. If this mental image is not startling enough, now picture actor Steven 
Seagal riding atop one of the tanks. This occurred, because Sheriff Arpaio paired 
up with Seagal’s show “Lawman”, when the Jefferson Parish Louisiana Sheriff’s 
Office ended their partnership with “Lawman” due to multiple allegations that 
Seagal was guilty of sex trafficking.245 What is more, that was not the first time 
Sheriff Arpaio had partnered with a reality television series in his arrests. A show 	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self-proclaimed as a cross between “Cops” and “Punk’d” called, “Smile… You’re 
Under Arrest!” on FOX, was a show about trying to trick people with outstanding 
warrants with sting operations exclusively in Maricopa County.246  
 With regard to the “Mexicans” portion of Lacey’s quote, Sheriff Arpaio 
while not always anti-illegal immigration, has now made it his number one goal to 
track down all undocumented immigrants, in so doing, often simply arresting 
anyone who looks Latino, which of course includes legal immigrants and citizens. 
In fact, in April a federal judge ruled that the constitutional rights of a legal 
immigrant and his son (a citizen) had been violated by the MCSO during a 
raid.247 As Lacey put it, "He's got a very famous quote about how he wasn't gonna 
[sic] be busting corn vendors or Mexicans on the street looking for work. That 
there were real criminals out there…But he discovered there were votes in going 
after Mexicans and he switched his policy 180 degrees."248 
 Now, he has created a carceral network of an all-volunteer citizen group 
that helps with immigration sweeps called the Sheriff’s Posse. He and his “Posse” 
are “busting corn vendors” among others in his raids and sweeps of homes, low 
wage service jobs (i.e. restaurants and car wash facilities), Cinco de Mayo parties; 
they even raided Mesa Public Library and Mesa City Hall.  
Sheriff Arpaio then took his panoptic gaze to the skies. Launching 
Operation Desert Sky, Arpaio’s volunteers and deputies fly fixed wing planes 	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with M-16s, 50 caliber machine guns, among other guns over the Arizona desert 
in an attempt to find “smugglers”.249 Of course, here it must be noted that the 
term “smugglers” has been broadened by the MCSO to encompass any 
undocumented immigrant under the justification that they have smuggled 
themselves across the border. No one can claim this man has a lack of creativity.  
 Arpaio attempts to rationalize these tactics saying that they only arrest 
those who are guilty of another crime other than unauthorized entry of the 
country. However, upon visiting the Florence detention center in Arizona, it 
became ever so clear that there were precious few charges that did not seem 
entirely fabricated. Admittedly, some were DUI charges. Yet, even those can be 
completely fabricated, because only the officer and the charged really know how 
the field sobriety test went, and it is the officer’s word against that of the person 
arrested. However, it was another charge that put these arrests in perspective: 
shoplifting bubble gum. One after another the charges for detention were read out 
as “stealing a pack of gum”. This is something easily fabricated, and it is hard to 
believe that there is what would appear to be a pandemic of chewing gum 
thievery.  
 Obviously, these antics have generated opposition, and so we “move on to 
editors and reporters.” Sheriff Arpaio has arrested several editors and reporters 
who critically judge Arpaio (in some cases multiple times) for charges that 
consistently are unable to hold water and none have been convicted. However, it 	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is not just editors and reporters who have been arrested, interrogated or 
investigated, but rather anyone standing in opposition to Arpaio: political 
opponents running against him for the office, judges who have ruled against 
Arpaio, numerous activists (most notably the prominent Salvador Reza), attorney 
for the ACLU – Daniel Pachoda, the Phoenix Mayor Phil Gordon, and Arizona 
Attorney General Terry Goddard. None have been convicted, yet all know they 
are constantly being watched.  
 Through 287(g) and his own creativity Sheriff Arpaio has created a 
massive carceral network of police and volunteers in his Posse working in tandem 
to investigate those who stand in his way, observe from the skies, and hunt from 
the roadside. In a panoptic manner, businesses do not know if they are being 
investigated and are the next site for a raid and neither do homes. While driving, 
you do not know if an undercover cop is tailing you. Even while in the remote 
desert, you do not know if Operation Desert Sky has identified you. If SB 1070 
remains in tact after it completes the federal courts obstacle course, the new 
crimes, level of allowable racial profiling, and responsibilities of the police force 
will bolster the ability of Sheriff Arpaio to spread and fortify his carceral network 
and panoptic gaze over Arizona. 
  110	  	  	  
 
Chapter 4: 
EMPIRICAL: CALL TO ACTION 
Introduction 
This thesis has shown that, fortified with over a century of case law, the 
plenary power doctrine is unwavering, and it makes federal immigration 
legislation an overly powerful tool in our political system from which the courts 
can offer little if any protection. Congress walks a fine line between preempting 
immigration regulation and devolving immigration regulation. SB 1070 and the 
287(g) program are two contested areas of immigration regulation, which both 
exhibit and alter the power relationships of immigration politics in Arizona. 
Additionally, the application of the theories of Michel Foucault 
illuminates the power relationships at play in Arizona – from the power 
relationships among nation states in the broader political arena of geopolitics and 
colonialism to the face-to-face power relationship between a police officer and a 
stopped/detained/arrested person in a Foucauldian carceral network.  
 This thesis now adds a call for empirical research that would yield an 
opportunity to analyze these relationships. This section discusses the importance 
of empirical study. It situates the study within the genre of surveillance studies 
and its theorists. It analyzes similar studies, and identifies the variables the most 
illuminating for this analysis.  
Background 
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham introduced the architectural design of a prison 
he named the Panopticon. In this design, a prisoner never knows if or by whom 
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he/she is being watched. Michel Foucault has since applied the idea of the 
Panopticon theoretically to society as a whole – much like the novel 1984. In 
modern times, Panopticism can be found in surveillance cameras, the existence of 
undercover cops, the surveillance of employee computer screens, metal detectors 
and the like.  
It is my belief, that there is a heightened level of Panopticism in Arizona 
due to the various means of “combating illegal immigration”. It is my hypothesis 
that immigration legislation and Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s “illegal” immigration 
crackdown methods have created a heightened sense of the panoptic gaze (or the 
sense that one might be being watched at any moment) among those who self-
identify as Hispanic/Latino.  
Feeling as though one is being watched might increase or induce stress 
and therefore cortisol levels. If there is a constant sense that you are being 
watched, then a person might enter into a state of chronic stress, as the literature 
on chronic stress suggests the experience of being watched may produce 
increased stress and affect the health status of the population.250 251 The 
physiological consequences of chronic stress were delineated above to include: 
hyperglycemia, type II diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, poor 
concentration, altered cognition, suppressed immune function and weight gain.252	   
Therefore, if immigration measures in Arizona are causing a subset of the 	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population to feel as though they are under constant surveillance, that subset of 
people might be put in a situation of developing chronic stress and the health risks 
that are associated with chronic stress. This could be categorized as structural 
violence.  
Authors Johan Galtung and Tord Höivik define structural violence quite 
well via a juxtaposition with direct violence stating that it is, “…that which kills, 
although slowly, and undramatically from the point of view of direct violence.”253 
It is also typically understood to be anonymous in that, unlike direct violence, a 
particular author might not be able to be pinpointed. It is rather the sum of various 
power relationships found in everything from geopolitics to the carceral network, 
which is one of the reasons a Foucauldian analysis of power relationships can be 
so illuminating as a base to further study on structural violence. 
In his article “The Condition of Illegality”, Leo R. Chavez illuminates that 
the inequalities caused by the structural position of illegality are a form of 
structural violence.254 By extension, the exacerbation of these inequalities by 
immigration legislation is, as well. This view could be supported by the 
abovementioned assertion that immigration leads to a panoptic gaze; a panoptic 
gaze leads to chronic stress, and chronic stress leads to health risks that could be 
said to kill slowly, if these links were properly supported with empirical evidence. 
Operating under the assumption that the government should not interfere with the 
fully attainable level of health of its populace via structural violence, these 	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possible links warrant further investigation. 
New Mexico and Arizona: The Ties That Bind 
 Gathering empirical evidence of the effects of a panoptic gaze in Arizona 
before and after the Immigration Legislation has been passed would be difficult, 
because it has already passed. Thus, it would be exceptionally beneficial to 
compare and contrast Arizona to a state without Immigration Legislation, yet a 
similar immigration history. In the book Colonias in Arizona and New Mexico: 
Border Poverty and Community Development Solutions, authors Adrian X. 
Esparza and Angela J. Donelson make a compelling argument for comparing and 
contrasting the border states of Arizona and New Mexico specifically. The 
authors state, “.. it makes sense to… study… Arizona and New Mexico, because 
their history, development, and border experiences are similar. At the same time, 
these states differ in substantive ways from Texas and California.”255  
 During the Spanish colonization of the territory now identified as Arizona 
and New Mexico the Spaniards created three royal highways to “funnel military 
troops, missionaries, and settlers,” so as to ultimately colonize and control the 
northern frontier.256  The gateway cities for each of these routes grew 
exponentially, and many traversed into Texas and California via Ciudad Juarez 
and Tijuana, respectively. Conversely, Arizona and New Mexico remained 
relatively unsettled. Esparza and Donelson give three main reasons for this:  
First, hostile Indians drove settlers away… The Chiricahua Apache 
and Western Apache of southeastern Arizona and southwestern 	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New Mexico were perhaps the fiercest warriors among the Indian 
groups… Second, the harsh terrain made settlement… immensely 
difficult. Third… Spain simply lost enthusiasm for settlement 
efforts. Spain’s money, power and authority dwindled toward the 
end of its conquest in Mexico.257 
 
Even once Mexico achieved independence from Spain in 1821, little 
changed in the way of settlement. Plagued by internal strife, Mexico did not set its 
sights on Arizona and New Mexico, but rather Texas and California. In 1846, 
after having warned the United States that war would follow an annexation of 
Texas (whose independence Mexico had not recognized), the Mexican-American 
war began. By 1848, it had ended. In the Treaty of Hidalgo, Mexico ceded nearly 
half of its territory, including: California, Nevada, Utah, almost all of Arizona (the 
rest was bought in the Gadsden Purchase), and some of New Mexico and 
Colorado. 
The United States had proposed the Gadsden Purchase in 1853, because of 
a desire to create a railroad to connect the aforementioned gateway cities of 
Ciudad Juarez/El Paso and Tijuana/San Diego, which were still booming. With 
that the Southern Pacific Railroad was built. Here Arizona and New Mexico’s 
fates were again tied, as the railroad trekked through both states and brought with 
it similar settlement and development.  
“Southern Arizona and New Mexico were at last opened to 
permanent settlement… the U.S. government developed military 
forts and camps… Yet, few settled the area until the military 
conquered the Apaches in 1886. With the construction of the… 
railroad… mining companies set up profitable operations in 
Arizona and New Mexico to extract copper... The railroad and 
mining industries stimulated southern Arizona and New Mexico 	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boomtowns, banking and an emerging agricultural industry. 
Settlers also continued to migrate to the area in yet another wave, 
prompted by the Mexican Revolution of 1910.”258  
 
Just as Arizona and New Mexico rose together in this period, they also fell 
together through various boom-and-bust periods due to this narrow economic 
base. Moreover, Arizona and New Mexico continued to be unique in this aspect 
as Texas and California had reliable diversified economies and international 
recognition. Esparza and Donelson cite four reasons for this. First, the Volstead 
Act of 1919 pushed tourist oriented businesses across the border into Tijuana and 
Ciudad Juarez, which made San Diego and El Paso considerably more popular 
destinations. Second, WWI and WWII gave El Paso and San Diego the 
opportunity to diversify their economies (as well as the creation of Fort Bliss in El 
Paso and a naval base in San Diego), while it locked Arizona and New Mexico 
into the lucrative business of copper mining, because the demand for copper 
during the wars was insatiable. Third, the Bracero Program between 1942 and 
1964 invited a large increase in migration, however most chose to go to already 
booming cities with diversified economies (read El Paso and San Diego). Lastly, 
Mexico’s 1965 Border Industrialization program sought to invite U.S. raw 
materials and parts into Mexico to be assembled in the maquiladoras; this meant 
the maquiladoras needed to be placed near the border in populous areas: El Paso 
and San Diego.259 
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The peso devaluations of 1982 and 1994, as well as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1986 caused the cost of Mexican labor to 
plummet.260 This lead to U.S. companies crossing the border to create their own 
maquiladoras, and migrant workers to head north to earn U.S. dollars, which were 
now worth substantially more than pesos, for remittance.  
As abovementioned in the brief history of broader United States 
immigration legislation, the 1980s onward has seen a shift toward controlling 
“illegal entry” or undocumented immigration, which began with President 
Reagan. However, President Reagan also set in motion border policy changes 
when he waged the War on Drugs. While the President was aiming at Florida as 
the target due to the Colombian drug cartels, perhaps the greatest impact was on 
the Southwest. The drug cartels followed the path of least resistance bringing with 
them cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines. Southern Arizona, generally, was 
labeled “high intensity drug interdiction zone,” and Nogales, specifically, became 
known as “cocaine alley”.261 The response to this was a dramatic increase in 
surveillance equipment; lights, sensors and cameras were installed and the drug 
raids began. In another effort to increase the efficacy of surveillance, the U.S. 
Border Patrol began “to direct efforts at urban centers to push immigrants to rural 
settings. This, it was believed, would make it easier to spot illegal immigrants.”262 
This trend of steadily increasing surveillance has continued to this day. 
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While economic factors have been lightly touched upon in the preceding 
paragraphs, it is important to explicitly show the relationship between labor 
necessity and open borders on the one hand and labor shortage and closed borders 
on the other, since in many analyses of immigration legislation this is referred to 
as a given. The Chinese Exclusion Act necessitated another source of cheap labor 
for the railroads, and this source came from Mexico. As abovementioned the 1910 
Mexican Revolution (and the incredible dearth of any immigration or border 
regulations) initiated a wave of migrants, which meant a surplus of Mexican labor 
drove down the cost of their already cheap labor much to the delight of 
employers.  
This cheap labor was so treasured, that the love-child of the rest of the 
country’s xenophobia and Social Darwinism – the Immigration Act of 1917 – was 
balked by the border states, because the literacy requirements and $8.00 head tax 
excluded most Mexicans. Before the end of the year, the federal government 
responded with a farm-worker program, excluding Mexican immigrants from the 
Immigration Act.  
The reason for the labor shortage that prompted employers to need the 
endless amount of cheap labor (WWI), reared its head again (WWII), therefore so 
did a federal program designed to satiate that need – the Bracero Program from 
1942 to 1964. The end of the Bracero Program came primarily because Arizona 
and New Mexico in the late 1950s and early 1960s saw a huge shift from 
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agriculture and mining to service oriented jobs, which have never been able to 
offer the same number of jobs or near the same wages.263  
There were, of course, secondary reasons. Human rights activists and 
those with nativist sentiments simultaneously called for the end of the Bracero 
Program. The human rights activists cited “substandard housing and exploitation 
of workers, especially poor pay and health issues.”264 Meanwhile, nativists cried 
invasion, because “the Bracero Program… unintentionally spurred the flow of 
undocumented workers… farmers and ranchers were not penalized for stepping 
outside the law, which meant that workers could be hired at lower rater and with 
no bureaucratic requirements,”265 which led to, “the subsequent imposition of 
Operation Wetback in 1954, wherein over one million Mexicans were 
deported.”266 It is ironic that the supporters of Operation Wetback heralding it as 
a “success” were calling for an end to the Bracero Program, because when the 
Bracero Program ended, unauthorized immigration skyrocketed and Operation 
Wetback was completely outpaced.  
The response to this had many faces including the federal immigration 
legislation discussed above (IRCA, Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act, IIRIRA, REAL ID, PATRIOT ACT, etc.). Yet one such 
response once more tied the fates of Arizona and New Mexico: Operation 
Blockade in El Paso and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego. While these 
operations attacked unauthorized immigration in several ways, both of these 	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operations focused primarily on prevention of entry rather than deportation (walls 
and surveillance). However, stopping it at Texas and California meant that 
unauthorized immigration was forced into Arizona and New Mexico. This was 
actually done intentionally. The designers of these programs believe the natural 
barriers and danger of the desert would be a deterrent, “But this was an ill-
conceived and inhumane policy, given the history of deaths on the border in the 
years that followed.”267 
However, there was still a labor shortage for certain jobs, because U.S. 
citizens did/do not take certain jobs. Therefore, there was another swing toward 
enticing authorized workers from Mexico. Bush’s 2005 plan for a guest worker 
program for 1.5 million farmworkers and 200,000 new temporary visas per year 
for low-skilled workers was put in place to aid business “because it would 
facilitate a regular supply of low-wage workers, primarily to agriculture but also 
to food processing, hotels and restaurants…Typically, these are hard, dirty, low-
paying jobs that in fact can’t find enough workers who are U.S. citizens.”268 In 
line with this constant relationship between labor and immigration legislation, 
2008 saw a loss of jobs and suddenly a plethora of immigration legislation aimed 
at “cracking down” on unauthorized immigration. This brings us to present day.  
Governor Jan Brewer prides herself on being tough on undocumented 
immigration, while Governor Bill Richardson attempts to “to integrate immigrants 
that are here and make them part of society and protect the values of our Hispanic 	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and multiethnic communities.”269 In 2010, of the passed legislation pertaining to 
immigration in Arizona, seven are hostile toward undocumented immigrants or 
the Latino and immigrant populations (only one could be termed favorable).270 
Among these bills passed by the Arizona State legislature was the controversial 
immigration enforcement bill (SB 1070). In 2010, of the passed legislation 
pertaining to immigration in New Mexico, eight are favorable to the Latino and 
immigrant populations (only one could be termed hostile).271 Among these bills 
passed by the New Mexico legislature was a resolution unveiling the economic 
benefits of undocumented immigrants.  
Surveillance Studies 
 As David Lyon defined it in his book Surveillance Studies: An Overview, 
surveillance “is the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details 
for purposes of influence, management, protection and direction.”272 Surveillance 
can be literal watching (either in person or through a camera); it can be listening  
(wiretapping or hearing a car go by with the Spanish radio station on); it can also 
be the amassing of information (think of the previously discussed NCIC database) 
often called dataveillance.  
Lyon also asserts, “Surveillance studies is about power… Whether it is the 
massive Department of Homeland Security in the USA or some rural school board 
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with cameras in buses, power is generated and expressed by surveillance.”273 
Surveillance can even be used against those in power. A Phoenix organization 
called Copwatch consists of activists who do just that; they monitor police 
agencies in the Valley by showing up to Arpaio’s raids with cameras in hand and 
rolling.274  
There are also common threads among surveillance sites. First, there is 
rationalization, wherein, “…standardized techniques are sought and reason… is 
prized.” Secondly, there is technology. Here it might be helpful to remember the 
Panopticon as a technology of power. Technology can be anything that 
economizes for greater efficiency the process of surveillance. Thus, it can be the 
central tower of the Panopticon instead of hundreds of guards or it can be a 
software program that mines for information. The third common thread is sorting. 
Here we can look back to Foucault’s “dividing practices.” “This process of 
distinguishing people on the basis of their perceived normality is an example of 
what Foucault calls dividing practices. Dividing practices operate through various 
social institutions such as hospitals, dividing the healthy from the sick; psychiatric 
clinics, dividing the sane from the mad, or the heterosexual from the homosexual; 
prisons, dividing the lawful from the criminal; and so forth.”275 The fourth thread 
is “knowledgeability” or the ability for life-details under scrutiny to be obtained 
and its impact on the degree to which surveillance is successful. The fifth thread 
is urgency, which “has become increasingly prominent within the safety-and-	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security-oriented world of the present, especially since 9/11…”276 The site of 
surveillance in Arizona can certainly be said to have this fifth thread, as political 
rhetoric has made some believe that an invasion from Mexico is imminent.  
Surveillance is often tied up with State administration and policing, 
especially in our literary imagination: George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
Franz Kafka’s The Trial, Margaret Atwood’s A Handmaid’s Tale, and Lois 
Lowry’s The Giver. Indeed, concern in the United States especially has been 
raised about undercover cops in civilian automobiles, and alternatively “…police 
cruisers… complete with wireless laptop systems on which the central police 
computer system can readily be accessed.”277 Indeed the concerns of the 
surveillance capabilities and practices of the state and of the police in particular 
are nothing new, but as “Controls are sought especially against… ‘dangerous’ 
offenders – and, even more, ‘terrorists’ … it is the poor and the marginal who are 
most deeply affected,”278 which is the impetus for this study, and many other 
surveillance studies.  
Classical Theorists in Surveillance Studies 
 Surveillance studies are interdisciplinary, although they rely heavily on 
sociology in particular. “This is somewhat ironic in view of the fact that 
sociologists have been seen both as suitable practitioners of surveillance and as 
appropriate targets for surveillance.”279 However, all social sciences are “engaged 
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in activities that may… be construed as surveillant,” 280 which is, of course, an 
argument Foucault makes in biopower, saying that governments have supported 
the human sciences in order to be more surveillant. It would be difficult to discuss 
the theoretical basis of a field of study purported to rely heavily upon sociology 
without at least giving a nod to the fathers of sociology: Karl Marx, Emile 
Durkheim, and Max Weber. 
Karl Marx. According to surveillance scholar Christian Fuchs, “Marx not 
only commented on economic surveillance, but also on the role of political 
surveillance,”281 and it was “a fundamental aspect of the capitalist economy and 
the nation state.”282 In the economic sense, Marx looked at how surveillance 
flowed down from the capitalist, to the managers, to the foremen/overseers, onto 
the workers. With regard to the nation state, “Marx argued that in the United 
States, population growth in the 19th century resulted in the surveillance of the 
states and regions,”283 and even referenced police surveillance.  
Moreover, Fuchs argues that Marx’s discussion of accumulation is an 
untapped application of Marx to surveillance as it “allows to systematically 
distinguish six forms of economic surveillance: applicant surveillance, workplace 
surveillance, workforce surveillance, property surveillance, consumer 
surveillance, and surveillance of competition.”284  
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However, it seems that in most surveillance studies Marx is merely 
mentioned as if to acknowledge that such a verbose theorist must have some 
connection with the subject matter, but no attempt is made to integrate Marx into 
surveillance studies. As Fuchs put it: “Surveillance scholars either claim that 
Marx ignored the phenomenon of surveillance or acknowledge to a certain degree 
the importance of Marx for surveillance studies, but at the same time relativize 
this statement by either conducting multidimensional analyses that miss causal 
connections, or by implicitly or metaphorically using certain Marxian concepts 
without connecting the analysis of contemporary surveillance phenomena 
systematically to Marx’s works.”285   
Emile Durkheim. David Lyon credits Emile Durkheim with contributing 
to surveillance studies through his theory of crime, in that it explains how socio-
economic stratification can lead to greater surveillance. Lyon summarizes it in the 
following way:  
When the gap between the relatively well-off and the relatively 
disadvantaged is growing… each group will come to see the other, 
increasingly, as a threat to their security. There may be both real 
and perceived increases in crime rates, because of the widening 
inequalities gap, and the better off will respond by supporting more 
draconian counter measures broadening the definition of ‘crime’. 
This includes obtaining technologies of self-protection, thus further 
excluding the more marginalized and targeting offender and 
innocent alike. Durkheim’s ideas may be extrapolated to suggest 
that more surveillance would follow, especially to maintain 
vigilance over public spaces, which would affect some ‘suspect’ 
categories disproportionately, thus adding to their stigma.286 
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This quote bears an uncanny resemblance to the climate in Arizona. Social 
stratification in Arizona is increasing; citizens and non-citizens fear each other. 
Perceived increases in crime rates (whether or not they truly exist) frighten both 
sides (increased hate crimes in Arizona and increased crime attributed to the 
undocumented population). Those in power have responded through broadening 
the definition of crime, and have employed new technologies of surveillance. 
These technologies are aimed at a marginalized population, target offenders and 
innocent alike, thereby adding to the stigma of some ‘suspect’ categories 
disproportionately.  
Max Weber. In surveillance studies, Max Weber receives 
acknowledgement for his discussion of bureaucratic administration. “Bureaucratic 
administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge.”287 Weber 
laid out preconditions leading to the emergence of bureaucracy as an 
administrative system of greater efficiency, which can also be looked to as 
conditions for greater surveillance (expanding area, population or tasks to be 
administered)288 and his rational-legal authority certainly shows the impetus 
behind the population’s acceptance of bureaucratic record-keeping.  
Modern Theorists in Surveillance Studies 
 While surveillance studies scholars seem to understand their indebtedness 
to classical theorists and attempt to give credit where credit is due by merely 
mentioning the names of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, their theoretical 	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contributions are taken for granted as a given and not discussed in any great 
depth. Current surveillance studies hinge more upon modern theorists: Jacque 
Ellul and (interestingly) novelist and social critic George Orwell. David Lyon 
explains this saying, “These figures… lent a moral seriousness and political 
urgency to the development of surveillance theory in the mid- to late twentieth 
century.”289 
Jacques Ellul. It is easy to see the reasoning behind early surveillance 
studies researchers’ and writers’ affinity with Ellul’s writings given that he 
critiqued totalitarianism, technology and the combination of the two. Ellul spoke 
of “La Technique” (“a cultural orientation towards ‘means’ rather than ‘ends’”). 
In other words, Ellul critiqued society’s obsession with creating more and more 
efficient technology for the means by which we live life, and especially by which 
we learn, as he was critical of the ways in which students were being taught to 
process information. Further, Ellul was an opponent of technology, as he saw it 
limiting our human freedom. Additionally important for surveillance studies, Ellul 
was critical of the effects of technologized policing in that “it requires more and 
more be supervised in the hope of apprehending more effectively those who 
violate rules and laws.”290 
George Orwell. 
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously…so long 
as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque 
commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of 
course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any 	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given moment… You had to live… in the assumption that every 
sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every 
movement scrutinized. 291 
 
While this particular nightmarish quote might not ring any particular bells, 
it has been extracted from a dystopian novel, whose title – albeit a year – is now 
pregnant with meaning in our English vernacular – Nineteen Eighty-Four. 
Nineteen Eighty-Four is a dystopian work of political fiction, yet George Orwell 
did not seek to create a futuristic setting that stood in contrast with the real world. 
He created a world that was a magnified reflection of his own times, the 
dictatorships of World War II. Airstrip One, Oceania is under a totalitarian regime 
controlled by the dictator: Big Brother. As is exemplified by the quote above, the 
inhabitants of Airstrip One are under constant surveillance. There are telescreens 
in homes and workplaces. Throughout the city, posters of the dictator are 
engineered so that his eyes follow you with the caption, “BIG BROTHER IS 
WATCHING YOU”, and perhaps the most threatening tool of surveillance are the 
fellow inhabitants of Airstrip One. There is the constant knowledge that someone 
might report any slight symptom of unorthodoxy to the thought police much the 
same way citizens in the Soviet Bloc would report neighbors to the KGB. 
Additionally, much like Argentina’s famous dirty war, the result of such a report 
would be sudden disappearance – usually accompanying torture and death.  
The truly horrifying aspect of this book, and perhaps the reason for its 
popularity, is its applicability. The KGB and Argentina’s dirty war are only two 
among thousands of scenarios that resemble 1984. In fact, while many have 	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interpreted Orwell’s novel to be strictly about communist countries or totalitarian 
regimes, Orwell clearly criticizes aspects of liberal democracies. In fact, the 
setting of the book is actually England (“… this was London, chief city of Airstrip 
One, itself the third most populations of the provinces of Oceania,”292).  
The setting and the circumstances surrounding the Big Brother 
government of Oceania, and the technologies of power are familiar enough, yet 
frightening enough to act at the very least as a call to action for surveillance 
scholars. Moreover, “Orwell’s work… has provided some of the most enduring, 
best-known and publicly accessible concepts in surveillance studies, above all the 
figure of Big Brother.” At the very least Nineteen Eighty-Four provided 
surveillance scholars a common language, albeit not newspeak.  
Postmodern Surveillance Studies 
Postmodern surveillance studies really seem to move out of the realm of 
classical or modern theory into studies based primarily upon new technologies 
and surveillance outside of the confines of the nation-state. It is about looking at 
how the internet has revolutionized surveillance, new methods for tracking 
consumers, and TSA airport security body scanners. As David Lyon put it, 
“…surveillance studies has often tilted towards a focus on the surveillance 
system, its technologies and its powerful institutions, to the neglect of analyzing 
the activities of those who are its subjects.”293 While the future research called for 
would not analyze the “activities” per se, it attempts to give voice to the 
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experience of those who are subjected to the heightened scrutiny of the panoptic 
gaze, as opposed to merely looking at the new technology present in Operation 
Desert Sky.   
Many in this postmodern phase of surveillance studies espouse a 
universality of surveillance or a “superPanopticon” of which we are all helplessly 
a part. Some in surveillance studies merely tout that we are now in a “surveillance 
society”.  Lyon cautions that such broad and often times conspiratorial claims, 
“are … potentially misleading, because they suggest merely a total, homogenous 
situation of ‘being under surveillance’ when the reality is much more nuanced, 
varying in intensity and often quite subtle.”294 Indeed, I am surveilled in my 
online shopping habits, and by swiping my card at the gym. However, that 
experience is completely different from knowing that shopping at a store with 
ethnic foods might make you and your home susceptible to heightened scrutiny or 
an immigration raid.  
Giorgio Agamben. It is important to note that there is one theorist that 
can be categorized in postmodern surveillance not so much in taking surveillance 
outside the confines of the nation-state (as he does not), but at least in the 
discussion of a constant state of surveillance. Agamben argues that the state of 
exception post-9/11 has become the rule and a “normal mode of government.” 
Agamben has something to add here in his idea of the bare life of those who are 
undocumented and have thus been banned from the political life that leads to 
good life. Moreover, Arizona can truly be said to be a State of Exception. The 	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time of crisis being a post 9/11 world and a time of economic recession, wherein 
people are made to feel that there is an invasion from the southern border. The 
government of Arizona has decided that these concerns trump the individual 
rights of citizens and non-citizens alike. Agamben looks at the effect of the state 
of exception or the banishment on individuals. It is for this reason, that I do not 
delve deeper into Agamben. This study seeks more to analyze the effect of the 
panoptic gaze in particular upon individuals, as opposed to the overall effect of 
the state of exception or banishment upon individuals. 
Between Modern and Postmodern 
“Some surveillance theories that may be considered to straddle the 
‘modern’ and the ‘postmodern’ rubric originate in the work of Michel 
Foucault.”295 It is here, that a surveillance study analyzing the abovementioned 
panoptic gaze and its effects would lie. While Michel Foucault’s relevance to 
surveillance has been thoroughly explained above, David Lyon has some 
criticisms of Foucauldian thought that will be dealt with here.  
Lyon claims, “This has yielded a rather one-sided account of surveillance 
that focuses heavily on the subtly coercive experience of living with the 
uncertainty of being seen, which for better or worse also lends itself to updating 
for an era of almost invisible electronic surveillance.”296 Here it is important to 
address the visibility issue. The visibility of the tower is important, but only 
insofar as that is how the prisoners knew they were capable of being watched in 
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an era when only another human could physically watch you. This was the 1700s. 
Now that people inherently know that they can be watched by invisible machinery 
and recorded for later viewing by a person, the tower is not necessary. All that is 
necessary is something to plant the seed that you are being watched. Immigration 
legislation plants that seed. 
Lyon also asserts that the Panopticon is overused and irrelevant, because it 
only pertains to enclosed spaces and does not account for new forms of digital 
surveillance. However, those who claim this are clearly missing the integral 
component of the carceral network, wherein the panoptic gaze escapes enclosed 
spaces and utilizes new technology as new technologies of power to spread the 
carceral network.  
Another criticism, however, of the Panopticon in current surveillance 
studies is the “failure of the Panopticon to produce docile subjects.”297 This I do 
not contest. For this reason, I do not suggest analyzing the behavioral component 
of Foucault’s theory. As mentioned in the previous chapter, reactions to the 
panoptic gaze run along the same spectrum of any reaction to any phenomenon in 
life, and even if bodies seem to be docile on the surface, feeling as though you are 
constantly watched can stir an internal bodily resistance.  
Lastly, Lyon charges: 
…many works in the ‘surveillance studies’ genre…stress the 
strength of panoptic power, constituting and positioning the subject 
in its thrall. Paradoxically, it is often just because surveillance 
studies is prompted by genuine concerns for human freedom, 
dignity or rights that the case for carceral control or Orwellian 	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oppression is made in these kinds of terms. But unfortunately such 
over-determined portrayals not only do a disservice to social 
science, by fostering the erroneous view that we all lie under the 
‘homogenous effects of power’ or some such humbug, but they 
also fail to respect the active subjects for whose lives they claim to 
speak. How this is perceived by the surveillance subject may make 
a difference.298  
 
This is precisely what the proposed idea for future empirical research 
attempts to move away from. Empirical research analyzing the set forth problem 
should show how Sheriff Arpaio’s carceral network does affect various groups 
differently and how these groups experience panoptic gaze. It should be held in 
the premise of the hypothesis that there is no homogenous effect of power over 
the population of Arizona.  
Relevant Surveillance Studies 
As acknowledged above, a study analyzing the panoptic gaze in Arizona 
caused by Immigration Legislation falls somewhere between modern and 
postmodern surveillance studies as it draws on Foucauldian theory. It does not 
belong among the postmodern era of the genre tend to focus upon new 
technological means of surveillance (TSA security body scanners), looking at 
surveillance outside of the nation-state (surveillance in health insurance), and a 
tendency to generalize surveillance as a “superPanopticon” or a “surveillance 
society” in which all are subject to a homogenous ever-present surveillance.  
Although more rare, there are studies that analyze surveillance not through 
new technologies, but rather in how people respond to surveillance. More 
importantly, these studies analyze how various groups of people respond to 	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surveillance. The following studies are each in some ways similar to a study of 
the panoptic gaze in Arizona, creating a family of studies to be joined. Yet each 
also differ in important ways from what such a study hopes to analyze, which 
precludes any ability to use pre-created surveys and scales.  
Although psychology scholars have created a well-respected scale for 
measuring paranoia – the Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales299, it does not 
capture the heightened sense of a panoptic gaze that this study should look for. 
First and foremost, it is geared toward measuring whether or not someone 
believes that anyone and everyone around them is talking about them, checking 
up on them, judging them, being hostile toward them, thinking about them…etc. 
It is not geared toward detecting whether or not someone feels the heightened 
sense of a panoptic gaze from the government or even from a large organization. 
Instead it measures whether or not people feel an increased level of scrutiny from 
unconnected individuals in their lives.  
Furthermore, if I were to use the term paranoid I would have to redefine it, 
much in the same manner as Nicholas Holm does in his article, “Conspiracy 
Theorizing Surveillance: considering modalities of paranoia and conspiracy in 
surveillance studies.” He argues that the clinical classification does not fit for 
surveillance studies, because it implies delusions. In fact, “paranoia was renamed 
‘delusional disorder’ in order to avoid confusion arising from the more specific 
lay usage… understood as persecutory delusions… ‘paranoid personality 
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disorder,’ … refers to a condition that while suspicious, is not solely concerned 
with observation or surveillance.”300 Therefore, neither clinical definition is 
appropriate. Moreover, Holm references George Marcus to point out that there is 
another (non-clinical) classification as “paranoia within reason” saying, “… under 
certain socio-political conditions paranoia is not only not irrational but actually 
the most rational response.”301 The American Psychology Association supports 
this further, because they “also acknowledge the possibility of ‘healthy paranoia’ 
in groups who have been subject to discriminatory behavior.”302 Given that this 
study would look at the sense of a panoptic gaze among people who have been 
historically subject to discriminatory behavior, it is not a clinical definition of 
paranoia that needs to be measured for diagnostic purposes, but rather ‘paranoia 
within reason’ or ‘healthy paranoia’, which traditional scales of paranoia (such as 
the Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales) do not measure. Therefore, the 
development of a new scale that does measure ‘healthy paranoia’ is necessary.  
With regard to the effect of immigration legislation, studies have been 
done analyzing the effects of immigration reform on: tourism, the labor market, 
the taxpayer, the number of immigrants, etc. Some come closer to the aim of this 
study (analyzing the effect of immigration legislation upon the people it targets) 
by analyzing the effect of immigration legislation on: immigrant’s access to 
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health care303, families and communities304 and psychological distress.305 
However, none actually discuss the effect of immigration legislation on a 
heightened sense of feeling watched.   
“Re-Thinking Illegality as a Violence Against Not By Mexican 
Immigrants, Children and Youth” looks at the structural violence caused by 
immigration legislation, yet it is not through the heightened sense of being 
watched accompanying immigration legislation, but rather through immigration 
legislation’s contribution to a discourse of undocumented immigrants as “ ‘illegal’ 
subjects worthy of disparagement…and of exploitation…”306 
 One study comes a little closer to the heart of the issue stating as its 
purpose:  
… to examine differences between documented and undocumented 
Latino immigrants in the prevalence of three immigration-related 
challenges (separation from family, traditionality [sic], and 
language difficulties), which were made more sever after the 
passage of restrictive immigration legislation in 1996. Specifically, 
the study sought to determine the combined and unique 
associations of legal status, the three immigration-related 
challenges listed above and fear of deportation to acculturative 
stress related to family and other social contexts.307  
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Interestingly, “Only fear of deportation emerged as a unique predictor 
of…acculturative stress.”308 This study lends credence to the argument that 
immigration legislation can create heightened stress, however it does not pinpoint 
a heightened feeling of being watched in light of immigration legislation as the 
cause of this stress, but rather fear of deportation specifically. Respondents in this 
survey were asked if they avoided or did not engage in certain activities, due to a 
fear of being deported. The activities included: walking in the streets, asking for 
help from government agencies, reporting a criminal or civil violation to the 
police, attending court if requested to do so, applying for a driver’s license or 
waiting on a street corner to solicit work.309 The surveys used for this study are 
not, therefore, directly applicable to highlighting a panoptic gaze, because the 
questions are not aimed specifically at finding out if people feel watched, but 
rather whether or not they avoid certain activities to avoid the possibility of being 
deported. While the participants might be avoiding these activities, because they 
feel watched, this question is not directly asked in the study.  
 The article “‘Eyes on Me Regardless’: Youth Responses to High School 
Surveillance” does look at “social panopticism” in schools exercising heightened 
surveillance on ‘problem populations.’310 However, it too does not look at the 
experience of being watched or the question of whether or not students feel 
watched when cameras decorate the school hallways and stairwells. Rather, the 
study looks at the response to “not merely the violence of feeling so heavily 	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watched, but the violence that accompanies unjust school policies directed at low-
income, urban youth of color students in these schools…”311 The article looks 
more specifically at various forms of resistance as a response in high schools with 
high levels of surveillance. 
 Other studies analyzing urban youth approach the idea of a panoptic gaze 
spread through the carceral network of police, and the idea that it is targeted more 
predominantly upon certain groups over others (“Wortley and Tanner… found 
that Black youth who were not involved with drugs or other delinquent activities 
were more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than those White youth 
who admitted involvement in illegal behavior,”312). However, these studies tend 
to rely upon an Attitudes Toward Police survey made up of four scales measuring: 
demeanor (ODEM scale), responsibility (RCC scale), discretion (DISC scale), 
patrol (APS scale), and officer characteristics (OCHR scale).313 None of these ask 
questions about whether people feel more or less subject to police surveillance. It 
would more helpful to have a survey with questions aimed at discovering how 
people perceive police attitudes toward the public or particular groups, as opposed 
to gleaning the public’s attitude toward police.  
 “‘Anything Can Happen With Police Around’: Urban Youth Evaluate 
Strategies of Surveillance in Public Places,” does go beyond the Attitudes Toward 
Police survey to incorporate surveys regarding comfort in schools, trust toward 	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adults, and rating how safe various places they frequent are. However, none of the 
questions get at whether or not the students feel a heightened sense of 
surveillance.314  
 “Lines and Shadows: Perceptions of Racial Profiling and the Hispanic 
Experience,” is the closest study among the literature to the study proposed in this 
thesis, and points to compelling reasons for the study, stating, “Most unfortunate 
was that little research examined racial profiling perceptions among Whites, 
Blacks and Hispanics. In fact, to date only two studies (that the authors were 
aware of) existed on comparing profiling perceptions across race, and both failed 
to examine Hispanics.”315 Additionally, the study listed reasons why it believed it 
worthwhile to study Hispanics as a separate group (as the authors of the study 
noted that often Hispanics are lumped in with other minority groups as simply: 
non-white).  
…it might be that the experience of Hispanics with the police was 
different in important ways from the experience of other racial and 
ethnic groups (Carter, 1983; Herbst & Walker, 2001). For 
example, Carter (1985, p. 489) suggested that one must recognize 
that the ethnic characteristics embodied in language, name, culture, 
and appearance create the same minority group dynamics found in 
racial discrimination. As these unique characteristics related to 
differing cultural norms, language barriers, familial upbringing and 
styles of dress, coupled with other exogenous variables such as 
neighborhood characteristics (e.g., crime rates) and socioeconomic 
status, Hispanics’ interactions with the criminal justice system 
could differ considerably from both non-Hispanic Blacks and 
Whites.316  
 
No mention is made of the fact that unlike other minorities Hispanics have a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Fine et al., “‘Anything Can Happen with Police Around’.” 
315 J. D Reitzel, S. K Rice, and A. R Piquero, “Lines and shadows: Perceptions of racial profiling 
and the Hispanic experience,” Journal of Criminal Justice 32, no. 6 (2004): 608. 
316 Ibid., 610. 
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greater propensity to be racially profiled for being undocumented, especially in 
states with laws aimed at immigration enforcement, and especially along the 
southern border. However, the study was conducted in New York (although, as 
shown in the legal section of this thesis, there have been pieces of legislation that 
would further marginalize the Hispanic population in New York).  
 The questions asked in order to discern the level of perceived racial 
profiling were:  
1. It has been reported that some police officers stop people of 
certain racial or ethnic groups because the officers believe that 
these groups are more likely than others to commit certain 
types of crime. Do you believe that this practice is widespread 
in New York City, or not? 0=no, 1=yes 
2. Do you believe that this practice is justified for police officers 
or not? 0 – not justified; 1 = justified. 
3. Have you ever felt you were stopped by the police just because 
of your race or ethnic background? 0= no; 1 = yes317 
 
While these questions hint at the question of a panoptic gaze, they are not 
sufficiently honed to the particular aim of this study. The hoped for study aims to 
find out if people feel more watched, not whether or not racial profiling is 
prevalent in the area, and this study does not aim to find out if various groups 
believe racial profiling is justified. The last question gets the closest to whether or 
not people feel more or less watched, however it misses the mark slightly. A 
person may feel more intensely watched by a mall cop, when they enter a store 
than someone else without ever having been stopped by the police, or ever having 
been stopped by the police in a manner that they believed it was due to their race 
or ethnic background. Moreover, such direct questioning might tap into (and 	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therefore solicit answers based upon) political ideology and political stances 
within immigration politics in Arizona, which could taint the study, and not yield 
true feelings of whether or not a person actually feels more or less watched than 
another person in normal everyday life.  
It is interesting to note: this study found Hispanic participants to be more 
likely than non-Hispanics to believe both that profiling was widespread and 
additionally that they personally had been profiled.318 With this finding the study 
ends with the following call to action, “Given the paucity of perceptual research 
on racial profiling in general, and that which incorporated Hispanics particularly, 
the findings suggested a strong need to better understand Hispanics’ experiences 
and perception.”319 This thesis echoes this call.  
Future Research 
This thesis has unveiled the need for further research to assess the effects 
of structural violence via immigration legislation on the well being of the Latino 
population. There should be further investigation as to whether Latinos feel as 
though they are being watched more so than their Caucasian counterparts. 
Additional research should analyze whether or not the sense that one is being 
monitored among Latinos is greater in states with greater numbers of hostile 
immigration legislation. Moreover, further research should analyze whether or not 
the gap between this sense of a panoptic-gaze among Latinos and this sense 
among Caucasians is greater in states with hostile immigration legislation. As 
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abovementioned, a good place to start in comparing states would be Arizona and 
New Mexico.  
 Foucault cautions about creating knowledges about people, and more 
specifically about marginalized populations. Future research on this topic must be 
executed with particular care, given that the study seeks to create knowledge 
about a marginalized population. Great attention must be paid to an ethical and 
respectful approach to the future research for which this thesis has laid the 
groundwork.
  142	  	  	  
 
Chapter 5: 
CONCLUSION 
Immigration legislation is a powerful tool. The plenary power doctrine 
created in the 1800s has been fortified with over a century of case law. Harisiades 
v. Shaughnessy contributed to this fortification deeming immigration law to be, 
“exclusively entrusted to the political branches… largely immune from judicial 
inquiry or interference.”320 Mathews v. Diaz gives these political branches even 
greater deference adding that political decisions “need… flexibility… rather than 
the rigidity … of constitutional adjudication.”321  
The case law discussed in this thesis shows how discrimination in creating 
subclasses of non-citizens was allowed first with regard to the person’s 
relationship to the United States (status and length of residency) in Mathews v. 
Diaz. Then Fiallo v. Bell extends this discrimination to permit the creation of 
subclasses based on gender, and Naranji v. Civiletti stretches the net of acceptable 
discrimination to include nationality. Lastly, INS v. St. Cyr implicitly grants 
Congress the power to strip aliens of Habeas Corpus without abiding by the 
prerequisites in the Suspension Clause. Thereby making recourse for any 
discrimination faced in immigration law more difficult and in some cases 
impossible.  
 There are some who argue that there is simply no longer a way to justify 
the constitutionality of immigration law exceptionalism, and others argue that this 
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plenary power conflicts with modern day international politics. Nguyen v. INS and 
Zadvydas v. Davis did show a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to not 
rely unquestioningly upon the plenary power doctrine. However, the plenary 
power doctrine is still unwavering, and it makes federal immigration legislation 
an overly powerful tool in our political system from which the courts can offer 
little if any protection.  
 The plenary power doctrine combines with the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution to create preemption, or the displacement of state law by federal law. 
De Canas v. Bica created a three-part test to determine whether or not a state law 
is preempted. However, in laying out such a test, De Canas implied that some 
state immigration legislation, or at least some provisions within state immigration 
legislation, would not be preempted. This is one of the reasons SB 1070 remains a 
daunting and powerful tool. While the execution of some provisions is on hold 
while the legislation winds through the court system, other provisions are already 
in effect. “As the case is litigated, Arizona will be able to block state officials 
from so-called ‘sanctuary city’ policies limiting enforcement of federal law; 
require that state officials work with federal officials on illegal immigration; 
allow civil suits over sanctuary cities; and to make it a crime to pick up day 
laborers.”322 
 Nevertheless, even if the entire bill were to be struck down as preempted, 
the state still has worrisome authority over immigration law. Despite several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 “Arizona Set to Appeal Judge’s Ruling on Immigration Enforcement Law,” Text.Article, July 
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impediments to Congress devolving power onto the legislative branch of the state 
(created in part by Graham v. Richardson and Aliessa v. Novello), Congress has 
found a way to devolve federal immigration law enforcement onto the executive 
branch of the state – INA provision 287(g). The coupling of (non-preempted) 
provisions in state immigration legislation (and the threat of other provisions 
being found in the future to not be preempted), and provisions in federal 
legislation is troubling; it can create a Foucauldian carceral network through 
which a panoptic gaze is placed upon those who self-identify as Latino/Hispanic 
in Arizona.  
In analyzing the various powers in immigration politics (either among 
federal branches of government, between the state and federal government, or 
between a government actor and a person subject to the technologies of power 
they wield) a theoretical lens helps to clarify the power relationships. The 
application of the theories of Michel Foucault provides fascinating insight into 
immigration politics in Arizona. This thesis illuminated the power relationships at 
play in Arizona from the power relationships among nation states in the broader 
political arena of geopolitics and colonialism to the face-to-face power 
relationship between a police officer and a stopped/detained/arrested person in a 
Foucauldian carceral network. At each level, Foucault’s theories can be seen in 
Arizona’s immigration politics.  
Revealing Arizonian immigration politics and Michel Foucault’s theories 
of power as analogous, while intriguing, only goes so far. It might be assumed 
that the Latino/Hispanic community in Arizona experiences the carceral network 
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executing a panoptic gaze negatively, but this has not yet been tested. Several 
studies have looked at the impact of immigration legislation, but not upon 
whether or not a population feels a heightened sense of being watched. Other 
studies have looked at reactions toward being watched, or attitudes toward police 
and perceptions of racial profiling. Yet all fall short of finding out whether or not 
a population feels a heightened sense of being watched.  
This is important, because it can lead to structural violence of a kind not 
discussed in immigration politics. As abovementioned, constantly feeling watched 
could bring about chronic stress, and the health risks associated with chronic 
stress.  
Therefore, this thesis calls for further research that would yield an 
opportunity to analyze these relationships. This thesis discusses the importance of 
studying this phenomenon empirically. It situates the study within the genre of 
surveillance studies and its theorists. It analyzes similar studies, and identifies the 
variables the most illuminating for this analysis. This thesis is written in the hope 
that a researcher will pick up where this thesis has left off. 
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